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Pricing volatility and business cyclicality in the energy sector 
periodically create the need for restructuring and reorganization.1 A 
distressed energy company with excessive leverage or insufficient cash 
flow may pursue out-of-court or in-court asset sales to dispose of 
unprofitable or non-strategic assets, increase liquidity, and create 
operational efficiencies. Potential purchasers face differing benefits and 
risks when dealing in distressed assets depending on the specific 
circumstances in each transaction. This article generally focuses on the 
process of dealing in distressed assets in the energy space, with special 
focus on upstream assets, and reviews certain of the benefits and risks 
often encountered. Part I of this article will discuss out-of-court 
acquisitions from distressed sellers, and Part II will discuss acquisitions of 
distressed energy assets in bankruptcy. 
I. OUT OF COURT ACQUISITIONS FROM DISTRESSED SELLERS 
Acquisitions of assets from distressed energy sellers frequently occur 
out-of-court. This part will discuss the benefits and risks of such out-of-
court transactions as compared to having such transactions approved as 
part of a bankruptcy proceeding. 
A. The Benefit of Speed and Execution 
The prompt execution of out-of-court asset purchases, with execution 
risk negotiated by the parties, potentially benefits buyers more than in-
court sales. The sale of assets outside of the ordinary course of business in 
bankruptcy cases requires notice and a hearing before the sale can be 
approved and frequently involves parties with competing interests. These 
logistical hurdles often require additional time and impose potentially 
higher costs when compared to out-of-court transactions, particularly if 
the sale process is heavily contested and litigated. At the same time, as will 
be discussed further, infra, sales under court supervision can also proceed 
in a timely, negotiated manner, as is often the case when parties in interest 
seek the common goal of maximizing value through a transparent and 
vetted marketing process. Notwithstanding the benefit of expeditious 
execution in asset sales outside of bankruptcy, risks attendant to out-of-
court sales by distressed entities exist, including potential allegations of 
fraudulent transfer and successor liability risk. 
                                                                                                             
 1. See William Wallander et al., Energy Restructuring and Reorganization, 10 
TEX. J. OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 1 (2014) [hereinafter Wallander] for a broader 
discussion on energy industry restructuring. 




B. The Fraudulent Transfer Risk 
In general, a “fraudulent transfer” (or “fraudulent conveyance”) is a 
transfer of property made to another party either (1) with the actual intent 
to defer, hinder, delay, or defraud creditors (actual fraud), or (2) for less 
than reasonably equivalent value when the transferor is insolvent or has 
inadequate capital (constructive fraud). Both federal and state law provide 
avoidance actions and recovery remedies for fraudulent transfers based on 
actual or constructive fraud. 
Under federal law, Bankruptcy Code § 548 provides that a transaction 
may be avoided for actual or constructive fraud if the transfer occurred 
within two years before the date of filing for bankruptcy.2 Additionally, 
Bankruptcy Code § 544 allows trustees to bring fraudulent transfer actions 
based on actual or constructive fraud under state statutes.3 All fifty states 
have laws prohibiting fraudulent transfers. While most states currently 
model such laws on the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), some 
still model their laws on the older Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act 
(UFCA). Still other states have recently updated their fraudulent transfer 
laws based on the Uniform Law Commission’s 2014 amendments to 
UFTA, which renamed the Act the 2014 Uniform Voidable Transactions 
Act (UVTA).4 The 2014 amendments, among other changes, incorporated 
choice of law rules and changed the statutory language to rid UVTA of 
any implication that constructively fraudulent transfers require fraud as 
opposed to statutory voidability.5 As of March 2016, eight states—
California, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, and North Dakota—have enacted UVTA, and four other states—
Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island—have, so far this year, 
introduced legislation seeking to do so.6 Bankruptcy courts frequently 
view both federal and state law fraudulent transfer cases as persuasive 
precedent when interpreting fraudulent transfer statutes.7 
                                                                                                             
 2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), (B) (2012). 
 3. 11 U.S.C. § 544. 
 4. For purposes of this Article, the phrase “uniform fraudulent transfer laws” 
refers to UFTA, UFCA, and UVTA collectively. 
 5. See UNIFORM VOIDABLE TRANSACTIONS ACT (FORMERLY UNIFORM 
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT) (as Amended in 2014), Nat’l Conference of 
Comm’r on Unif. State Laws, available at http://goo.gl/eEQzSo (last visited 
March 23, 2016, 10:29 p.m.). 
 6. For a map of states that have enacted UVTA and states that have 
introduced legislation to adopt it this year, see the website for the Uniform Law 
Commission, Voidable Transactions Act Amendments (2014) – Formerly 
Fraudulent Transfer Act, available at http://goo.gl/5k8wIw(last visited March 23, 
2016, 10:32 p.m.). 
 7. See, e.g., In re Grandote Country Club Co., 252 F.3d 1146, 1152 (10th 
Cir. 2001). 
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Notably, many state statutes contain fraudulent transfer look-back 
periods beyond the Bankruptcy Code’s two-year limitations period.8 
Under the version of UFTA adopted by most states, including Texas and 
Delaware, the limitations period for fraudulent transfers extends up to four 
years.9 Under New York’s version of UFCA, however, the limitations 
period spans up to six years after the conveyance.10 
1. Actual Fraud: Federal and State Law 
First, a trustee may avoid transfers made or obligations incurred by a 
debtor by establishing actual fraud. Broadly stated, to prove actual fraud 
under either Bankruptcy Code § 548 or state law enactments of the 
uniform fraudulent transfer laws, the trustee or debtor in possession must 
show that the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation “with 
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” creditors.11 
Bankruptcy courts often look for “badges of fraud” in determining 
whether a party possessed the requisite intent to constitute actual fraud.12 
The badges of fraud often comprise the following: 
1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; 
2) the debtor retained possession or control of the property 
transferred after the transfer; 
3) the transfer or obligation was concealed; 
4) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the 
debtor had been sued or threatened with suit; 
5) the transfer was of substantially all of the debtor’s assets; 
6) the debtor absconded; 
                                                                                                             
 8. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1), (b) (2012) (permitting trustee to avoid any actual and 
constructive fraudulent transfers “made or incurred on or within 2 years before the 
date of the filing of the petition”). 
 9. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 24.010 (1993) (setting forth the rule that, in 
order to commence a fraudulent transfer action beyond the four-year limit, the claim 
must be brought “within one year after the transfer or obligation was or could 
reasonably have been discovered by the claimant”); 6 DEL. CODE § 1309 (same). 
 10. N.Y. CODE § 213(8) (“[T]he time within which the action must be 
commenced shall be the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued 
or two years from the time the [claimant] discovered the fraud, or could with 
reasonable diligence have discovered it.”). 
 11. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A). 
 12. See, e.g., Williams v. Houston Plants & Garden World, Inc., 508 B.R. 11, 
18–19 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2014) (citing In re Soza, 542 F.3d 1060, 1067 (5th Cir. 
2008)). 




7) the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
8) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was not 
reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or 
the amount of the obligation incurred; 
9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the 
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; 
10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a 
substantial debt was incurred; or 
11) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a 
lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.13 
Not all badges of fraud must be present for a bankruptcy court to find 
actual intent.14 In fact, depending on the circumstances, a few badges may 
be sufficient to support a finding of actual fraud.15 
2. Constructive Fraud: Federal and State Law 
Next, if a trustee or debtor in possession is unable to establish actual 
fraud, it may nevertheless avoid transfers made or obligations incurred by 
a debtor under Bankruptcy Code § 548 by establishing constructive fraud 
(or voidability under UVTA). To prove constructive fraud under the 
Bankruptcy Code, the trustee or debtor in possession must show that the 
debtor received less than a “reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for 
such transfer or obligation, and that the debtor: 
1) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such 
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of 
such transfer or obligation; 
                                                                                                             
 13. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 24.005(b); 6 DEL. CODE § 1304(b). See also 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.04(b). 
 14. See In re ASARCO L.L.C. v. Ams. Mining Corp., 396 B.R. 278, 371–72 
(S.D. Tex. 2008) (“It is not necessary that all or any one of these badges of fraud 
support a finding of fraudulent intent; nor can one badge alone make out an 
inference of actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. Rather, ‘the 
confluence of several [badges of fraud] in one transaction generally provides 
conclusive evidence of an actual intent to defraud.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 15. Id. 
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2) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to 
engage in business or a transaction, for which any property 
remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital; 
3) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts 
that would be beyond the debtor’s ability to pay as such debts 
matured; or 
4) made such transfer to or for the benefit of an insider, or incurred 
such obligation to or for the benefit of an insider, under an 
employment contract and not in the ordinary course of 
business.16 
The state law enactments of the uniform fraudulent transfer laws apply 
a similar standard to that in Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(1)(B). In Texas, for 
example, a trustee may establish constructive fraud as to a creditor, 
whether the creditor’s claim arose before or within a reasonable time after 
the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, by showing that the 
debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving 
“reasonably equivalent value” for the transfer or obligation and: 
 
1) “was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a 
transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were 
unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction”; 
or 
2) “intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have 
believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond the 
debtor’s ability to pay as they became due.”17 
 
Additionally, most state law enactments of the uniform fraudulent 
transfer laws—including the Texas statute—provide that a transfer made 
or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim 
arose before such transfer or obligation if the debtor made the transfer or 
incurred the obligation “without receiving a reasonably equivalent value 
in exchange for the transfer or obligation” and “was insolvent at that time 
or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.”18 
As a further consideration, a transfer made by a debtor is deemed 
fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before such transfer occurred 
if the transfer was (1) “made to an insider for an antecedent debt,” (2) “the 
debtor was insolvent at that time,” and (3) “the insider had reasonable 
                                                                                                             
 16. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 17. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 24.005(a)(2). 
 18. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 24.006(a); 6 DEL. CODE § 1305(a); CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 3439.05. 




cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.”19As will be shown in 
greater detail infra, constructive fraud determinations often hinge on 
whether “reasonably equivalent value” was exchanged, and disputes 
frequently arise regarding the value of the assets transferred in the 
challenged transaction. 
3. Defenses and Mitigating Risk of Avoidance 
In an effort to mitigate exposure to fraudulent transfer claims, a 
purchaser should be aware of the potential risks attendant to entering into 
a transaction with a distressed seller. Additionally, a purchaser should 
consider whether relevant facts satisfy the elements of the legal tests for 
actual or constructive fraud and, if so, whether any affirmative defenses 
are available. Bankruptcy courts often consider the non-exclusive list of 
“badges of fraud” discussed supra as indicia of an intent to hinder, delay, 
or defraud creditors when a trustee is seeking to establish actual fraud 
under Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(1)(A) or applicable state law.20 A 
purchaser should be aware of the badges of fraud and their applicability to 
the transaction at issue. 
Further, parties frequently litigate voidability issues and disputes 
regarding whether reasonably equivalent value was given for the assets 
transferred. Inherent in transactions with distressed entities, a purchaser 
always bears the risk that a bankruptcy court will look back in time and 
determine that less than reasonably equivalent value was given in 
exchange for distressed assets. The Bankruptcy Code does not define 
reasonably equivalent value; rather, a bankruptcy court makes that 
determination on a fact-intensive, case-by-case basis. 
Determining whether reasonably equivalent value was given in 
exchange for estate property requires valuation of the assets exchanged.21 
Bankruptcy courts possess wide latitude in determining whether to value 
assets at fair market value as opposed to liquidation value.22 Indeed, 
                                                                                                             
 19. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 24.006(b); 6 DEL. CODE § 1305(b). 
 20. See, e.g., ASARCO L.L.C., 396 B.R. at 371–72. 
 21. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (2012) (establishing that the determination of a 
debtor’s insolvency be made according to “fair valuation”); 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) 
(2012) (declaring that the value of a secured creditor’s claim shall be “determined 
in light of the purpose of the valuation”); In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., 679 F.3d 
132, 141 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Congress envisioned a flexible approach to valuation [under 
11 U.S.C. § 506(a)] whereby bankruptcy courts would choose the standard that best 
fits the circumstances of a particular case.”) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95–595, at 356 
(1977) (“Courts will have to determine the value on a case-by-case basis, taking into 
account the facts of each case and the competing interests in the case.”). 
 22. In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., 679 F.3d at 141. 
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valuing energy assets is a highly complex, yet inexact, science.23 When 
faced with the difficult challenge of valuing energy assets, bankruptcy 
courts often use one of four valuation methods: (1) discounted cash flow, 
(2) comparable companies, (3) comparable transactions, or (4) market 
approach.24 
Under the “discounted cash flow” (DCF) analysis, a company’s future 
cash flow is projected and then discounted to present value utilizing the 
projected weighted average cost of capital.25 Generally, a DCF analysis 
depends on three criteria: (1) the size of the expected future cash streams 
to be generated by the business; (2) the discount rate employed in 
determining the present value of such income streams; and (3) the terminal 
multiplier used to capture any residual value remaining in the business at 
the end of the projection period.26 A company’s past performance is 
commonly used to assess growth projections and estimates.27 However, 
bankruptcy courts are not bound by specific metrics and are free to value 
assets based on the specific circumstances of each case. The further into 
the future a valuation extends, the more likely a bankruptcy court is to take 
a more conservative approach because time amplifies risk and 
unforeseeable contingencies.28 Furthermore, courts are likely to shy away 
from more aggressive or selective valuations in contingent contexts.29 As 
the energy industry continues to operate in new and remote locations, the 
process of calculating risks and estimating contingencies will continue to 
impact DCF analyses and create challenges in the valuation process. 
By comparison, under the “comparable company” analysis, the 
relative value of peer companies is analyzed in order to determine the 
value of a debtor’s assets. The comparable company valuation is 
comprised of two steps. First, the debtor’s earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) is calculated. Then, in order to 
determine the debtor’s value, “the multiple of a ‘healthy’ comparable 
company’s market-assigned enterprise to its corresponding EBITDA” is 
                                                                                                             
 23. In re Sherman, 157 B.R. 987, 989 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993) (“No other 
area is more central to the bankruptcy process yet more perplexing to those 
practitioners and courts presented with its permutations than the question of 
valuation of assets.”). 
 24. Hon. Christopher S. Sontchi, Valuation Methodologies: A Judge’s View, 20 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 16 (2012) (quoting In re Chemtura Corp., 439 B.R. 561, 
573 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“It is important to remember that bankruptcy judges 
have become familiar and comfortable with the DCF, comparable companies and 
comparable transactions methodologies. Indeed, these methods are often referred to 
as the ‘standard’ methodologies.”) [hereinafter Sontchi]; See also VFB L.L.C. v. 
Campbell Soup Co., 482 F.3d 624, 633 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 25. Sontchi, supra note 24, at 7. 
 26. In re Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 171 B.R. 926, 930 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 27. See In re Mirant Corp., 334 B.R. 800, 836 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005). 
 28. Id. at 827–29. 
 29. Id. 




calculated and multiplied by the debtor’s EBITDA.30 The comparable 
company analysis can be challenging; identifying comparable companies 
can be difficult because risk exposure and industry contingencies 
frequently distinguish seemingly comparable companies based on 
differences in industry, energy operation, and geographic location.31 
Alternatively, the “comparable transaction” analysis considers recent 
transactions of similarly situated assets and companies, which are then 
extrapolated and applied to scale the value according to a debtor’s relevant 
assets or enterprise value.32 Ideally, the comparable transaction should be 
as recent in time as possible and take place within similar market 
conditions,33 and the details of the transaction should be straightforward 
and accessible.34 These considerations are especially important in the oil 
and gas industry given the movement of commodity prices. 
Finally, when utilizing the “market approach” analysis, courts look to 
market evidence and other economic indicators to assess the total capital 
value of a debtor and its assets.35 The market value of a debtor may be 
estimated by looking to the stock or bond market price of a debtor’s 
securities.36 Despite its functionality, bankruptcy courts have expressed 
concerns regarding market value analysis, including: (1) the impact of 
“taint” or “stigma” of bankruptcy on an asset’s price due to the market’s 
                                                                                                             
 30. Kerry O’Rourke, Valuation Uncertainty in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 
2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 403, 420 (2005). 
 31. See In re Mirant Corp., 334 B.R. at 837–38. 
 32. See Sontchi, supra note 24, at 12–13. 
 33. In re Genco Shipping & Trading Ltd., 513 B.R. 233, 253 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2014); In re Chemtura Corp., 439 B.R. at 585 (“I find that the 
[compared] transaction was indeed the most appropriate comparable transaction, 
both by nature of company being acquired and in time.”); In re Exide Techs., 303 
B.R. 48, 62–63 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (refusing to compare transactions in an 
industry where the market changed considerably from 1998 to 2002). 
 34. See In re Chemtura Corp., 439 B.R. at 585–86 (noting that the transaction 
does not need to be closed to be considered under this analysis if sufficient 
documentation is available). 
 35. See VFB L.L.C. v. Campbell Soup Co., 482 F.3d at 632–33; U.S. Bank Nat’l 
Ass’n. v. Verizon Commc’ns. Inc., 892 F. Supp. 2d 805, 808–14 (N.D. Tex. 2012). 
 36. VFB L.L.C., 482 F.3d at 633 (“[A]bsent a compelling reason to distrust it, the 
market price is ‘a more reliable measure of the stock’s value than the subjective 
estimates of one or two expert witnesses.’”) (citing In re Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 320 (7th 
Cir. 1996)). 
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tendency to irrationally undervalue distressed assets and companies;37 (2) 
the uncertainties a bankruptcy case may create in valuing an already 
complex asset;38 and (3) the existence of fraud or concealment of material 
information to the market.39 Nonetheless, the trend among bankruptcy 
courts is to apply greater scrutiny when a party suggests a valuation that 
differs from the valuation derived via an active and discernible market.40 
As part of the valuation process, parties often retain third party experts or 
consultants to evaluate energy transactions with distressed entities. Because 
valuation of energy assets is highly situational, bankruptcy courts must 
frequently make determinations based upon “battle[s] of the 
experts.” Notably, bankruptcy courts have favored experts with real 
experience in the energy field, even if an expert lacks an advanced degree.41 
Another defense strategy may be to argue solvency of the transferor at 
the time of the transfer. A “solvency opinion” or “valuation opinion” from 
a third party expert can support a buyer’s valuation position and may help 
mitigate the risk that a party will bring an avoidance action to claw back 
the assets.42 Further, in public company scenarios, securities trading values 
indicative of solvency can be utilized.43 A third party “fairness opinion,” 
which states that the transaction was done fairly both procedurally and 
substantively, may also support a buyer’s valuation position. 
Certain transfers can be defended from voidability if the transferee acted 
in “good faith” and the transfer was “for value” under applicable federal or 
state fraudulent transfer law. Bankruptcy Code § 548(c) provides that “a 
                                                                                                             
 37. In re Mirant Corp., 334 B.R. at 834–35; see also In re Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co., 596 F.2d 1102, 1115 (3d Cir. 1979) (recognizing that, in some instances, 
“evidence of market value should be ignored because the market can be expected 
irrationally to undervalue the securities of a once-distressed company emerging from 
a lengthy reorganization”); In re New York, N.H. & H. R.R. Co., 4 B.R. 758, 792 (D. 
Conn. 1980) (“The stigma of bankruptcy alone is a factor that will seriously depress 
the market value of a company’s securities.”); In re Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 39 F. 
Supp. 436, 446 (E.D. Mo. 1941) (“[The] debtors have been in the process of 
reorganization for eight years, which fact alone would necessarily result in a serious 
depression in the market value of its securities.”). 
 38. In re Mirant Corp., 334 B.R. at 834. 
 39. See Tronox Inc. v. Kerr McGee Corp. (In re Tronox Inc.), 503 B.R. 239, 
298–303 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (indicating that market valuation was not 
indicative of value where the information was obscured). 
 40. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n., 892 F. Supp. 2d at 808–14; VFB L.L.C., 
482 F.3d at 632–33. 
 41. Floyd v. Hefner, 556 F. Supp. 2d 617, 639 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (“[The 
expert’s] lack of a formal accounting degree does not disqualify his opinions in 
this case given the level of his professional experience in [the oil and gas] field.”) 
(citing S. Cement Co. v. Sproul, 378 F.2d 48, 49 (5th Cir. 1967)). 
 42. See In re Tronox Inc., 503 B.R. at 301–03. 
 43. Trustee of the Idearc Inc. Litigation Trust v. Verizon Commc’ns. Inc. 
(U.S. Bank Nat’l Assn. Litigation), 817 F. Supp. 2d 934 (N.D. Tex. 2011); 
Statutory Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Motorola, Inc. (In re Iridium 
Operating L.L.C.), 373 B.R. 283 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 




transferee or obligee of such a transfer or obligation that takes for value and 
in good faith has a lien on or may retain any interest transferred or may enforce 
any obligation incurred” to the extent the transferee or obligee exchanged 
value for such transfer or obligation.44 Similarly, UFTA, as adopted by Texas 
and Delaware, provides that a transfer or obligation is not voidable against a 
person who took in good faith for reasonably equivalent value.45 The 
valuation methods discussed supra also come into play with respect to the 
value prong of this defense. As to whose perspective will determine value in 
the context of this affirmative defense (i.e., the transferee’s or the creditor’s), 
the result may vary depending upon whether Bankruptcy Code § 548(c) or 
state law is applied.46 
4. Recovery of Assets Transferred or the Value Thereof 
Once a transaction has been avoided, both the Bankruptcy Code and 
state law grant a trustee the power to recover fraudulently transferred 
assets, or the value of those assets, for the benefit of the bankruptcy 
estate.47 Specifically, Bankruptcy Code § 550 provides that a trustee may 
recover the transferred property or its value from “(1) the initial transferee 
of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made; or 
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.”48 
A good faith purchaser or transferee holds a lien on the property to secure 
the value of any “improvements” made to the property after the transfer.49 
Additionally, an action for recovery may not be brought after the earlier of (1) 
one year after the avoidance of the transfer under bankruptcy law, or (2) the 
time the bankruptcy case is closed or dismissed.50 
Similar to the standard set forth in § 550, many state fraudulent transfer 
statutes provide a comparable recovery standard. For example, Texas law 
provides that, to the extent a transfer is voidable, a creditor may recover the 
                                                                                                             
 44. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (2012). 
 45. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN § 24.009(a) (2015); 6 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
§ 1308(a) (2015). 
 46. Cf. Janvey v. Golf Channel, Inc., 780 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2015) with Williams 
v. FDIC (In re Positive Health Mgmt.), 769 F.3d 899 (5th Cir. 2014), and Jimmy 
Swaggart Ministries v. Hayes (In re Hannover Corp.), 310 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 47. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a); See also 11 U.S.C. § 550(d) (“The trustee is entitled 
to only a single satisfaction . . . .”) 
 48. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a). However, Bankruptcy Code § 550(b) provides that for 
any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee under Bankruptcy Code 
§ 550(a)(2), the trustee may not recover from: “(1) a transferee that takes for value, 
including satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt, in good faith, and 
without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided; or (2) any immediate or 
mediate good faith transferee of such transferee.” 11 U.S.C. § 550(b). 
 49. 11 U.S.C. § 550(e). 
 50. 11 U.S.C. § 550(f).  
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lesser of the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the creditor’s claim 
against: “(1) the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the 
transfer was made; or (2) any subsequent transferee other than a good faith 
transferee who took for value or from any subsequent transferee.”51 
Additionally, Texas law provides that if the creditor’s recovery is based on 
the value of the asset transferred, the value is calculated as of the time such 
asset is transferred, subject to equitable adjustment as necessary.52 
5. Examples of Recent Fraudulent Actions 
Recent examples of fraudulent transfer actions help illustrate the 
application of fraudulent transfer laws.53 For example, in its 2008 decision in 
In re ASARCO, the District Court for the Southern District of Texas 
considered whether a transaction, by which a parent company received a 
transfer of the “crown jewel” asset of its subsidiary, constituted an actual or 
constructive fraudulent transfer.54 The plaintiffs, ASARCO (a copper mining 
company) and its wholly-owned subsidiary, sued the debtor’s parent 
corporation, Americas Mining Corporation (AMC), claiming that AMC’s 
transfer of Southern Peru Copper Company’s (SPCC) stock constituted a 
fraudulent transfer.55 ASARCO had directly held a majority ownership 
interest in SPCC, which was a very profitable company.56 However, when 
AMC acquired ASARCO, AMC directed that the SPCC stock be transferred 
to a subsidiary wholly-owned by ASARCO, Southern Peru Holding 
Company (SPHC), which ASARCO alleged had been set up by AMC as a 
sham entity in order to hold the SPCC stock—allowing for pledging of the 
stock as loan collateral while also removing it from the reach of ASARCO’s 
creditors.57 Notably, the stock removal occurred after AMC bought ASARCO 
without completing full due diligence, thereafter discovering ASARCO’s 
substantial environmental liabilities.58 Subsequently, AMC caused SPHC to 
transfer its shares in SPCC to AMC.59 The court pierced the veil between 
SPHC and ASARCO so that ASARCO could challenge the transfer of the 
SPCC stock to AMC as a fraudulent transfer of property of ASARCO.60 
                                                                                                             
 51. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 24.009(b). 
 52. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 24.009(c)(1). Texas law also provides that 
courts are not to adjust the value of the assets transferred to include the value of 
improvements made by a good faith transferee. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 
24.009(c)(2). 
 53. In addition to the two prominent cases discussed in this section, see 
Appendix A for further examples of key fraudulent transfer cases. 
 54. ASARCO L.L.C., 396 B.R. at 299–315. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. ASARCO L.L.C., 396 B.R. at 335. 




The plaintiffs asserted actual and constructive fraudulent transfer 
claims pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 548 and the Delaware fraudulent 
transfer statute.61 Regarding constructive fraud, the court looked to 
Delaware law and analyzed whether “reasonably equivalent value” was 
transferred for the SPCC stock transfer.62 The court analyzed each aspect 
of consideration for the stock transfer, applying a market valuation with 
consideration of stock price, a comparable company analysis, and a 
discounted cash flow analysis in order to value the stock.63 After 
completing its valuation, the court found that, under the totality of the 
circumstances, ASARCO received eighty-five to ninety percent of the 
SPCC stock’s value, which constituted “reasonably equivalent value.”64 
Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ constructive fraudulent transfer claim 
failed.65 
However, as to actual fraud, the court considered whether the SPCC 
stock transfer was made with the “actual intent to hinder, delay or 
defraud any creditor of the debtor” under Delaware law and Bankruptcy 
Code § 548.66 As a threshold matter, the court found that, while the 
debtor must be the party who transfers with the intent to hinder, delay, 
or defraud creditors, AMC possessed the requisite domination and 
control of ASARCO such that actual fraudulent intent could be imputed 
to it.67 Next, the court examined the statutory “badges of fraud” and other 
salient factors based on “all surrounding facts and circumstances.”68 The 
court found actual fraud based on intent to hinder and delay, particularly 
because AMC did not properly market the stock to the highest bidder, 
removed the “crown jewel” asset from the estate, concealed and altered 
information, broke promises to ASARCO’s independent directors, and 
closed the transaction over the objections of the independent directors 
with knowledge that the transaction would hinder and delay the debtor 
                                                                                                             
 61. Id. at 335–94. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 342–64. 
 64. Id. at 364. 
 65. Id. 
 66. ASARCO L.L.C., 396 B.R. at 364–65. 
 67. Id. at 369–70. 
 68. Id. at 370–80. 
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paying other creditors.69 The court ultimately entered a judgment against 
AMC valued at over $6 billion.70 
In another example, In re Tronox, the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of New York considered whether the spin-off of a 
profitable portion of a parent company’s business that left the parent with 
substantial liabilities constituted an actual or constructive fraudulent 
transfer under the Oklahoma fraudulent transfer statute.71 In this case, Old 
Kerr-McGee (later renamed “Tronox”) was an energy company with a 
wide range of energy and chemical operations.72 After a spinoff in 2006, 
Tronox retained substantial legacy environmental and tort liabilities that 
accrued over the course of seventy years, while the valuable oil and gas 
exploration and production business was transferred into the newly-
formed New Kerr-McGee.73 A few months after the spinoff, Anadarko 
Petroleum purchased New Kerr-McGee’s recently acquired exploration 
and production business for $18 billion;74 Tronox subsequently filed for 
bankruptcy on January 12, 2009.75 
Regarding actual fraud, the court applied the Oklahoma fraudulent 
transfer statute, which provides a four year statute of limitations for 
fraudulent transfer claims.76 The court distinguished between “intent to 
defraud” and “intent to hinder or delay” and found legally sufficient 
grounds to impose fraudulent transfer liability where defendants acted 
with the mere purpose or “intent to hinder and delay” creditors.77 The court 
concluded that separating the E&P business and assets from the legacy 
liabilities was a primary driver in the spinoff and that the parties 
understood the adverse impact on Tronox’s creditors.78 Further, the court 
found evidence of “badges of fraud,” including: (1) transfers among 
insiders; (2) retention of control of transferred assets; (3) “ineffective and 
                                                                                                             
 69. Id. at 386–94. 
 70. According to the law firm representing ASARCO as debtor in possession, 
the value of the judgment exceeded $6 billion. See News Release, Baker Botts, Federal 
District Judge Awards ASARCO Damages Estimated at More Than $6 Billion, 
available http://www.bakerbotts.com/news/2009/04/federal-district-judge-awards-
asarco-damages-est (last visited May 11, 2015). Some estimates of the value of the 
judgment range as high as $10 billion. See, e.g., ASARCO L.L.C. v. Baker Botts, 
L.L.P. (In re ASARCO, L.L.C.), 751 F.3d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted on  
other grounds, 135 S.Ct. 44 (Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 14-103). 
 71. In re Tronox Inc., 503 B.R. at 248–52. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 262–63. 
 76. Id. at 277. 
 77. Id. at 277–79 (“The ASARCO Court could also have cited Shapiro v. 
Wilgus, where the Supreme Court made it clear that the debtor’s scheme did not 
have to be undertaken for nefarious or malicious purposes but merely with the 
purpose of hindering or delaying creditors.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 78. In re Tronox Inc., 503 B.R. at 280. 




insubstantial” disclosure of transfers in SEC filings; (4) threats of litigation 
regarding legacy liabilities prior to the transactions; and (5) the transfer 
for substantially all of Tronox’s assets.79 
In the end, the court found unpersuasive the defendants’ argument that 
a “legitimate supervening cause” for the transfer aimed at “unlocking” the 
chemical business existed.80 Further, the court rejected the defense that the 
defendants believed Tronox would remain solvent and be able to continue 
to pay debts as they became due.81 Instead, the court stated, the “real 
question is whether the [d]efendants had a good faith belief that Tronox 
would be able to support the environmental and other legacy liabilities that 
had been imposed on it.”82 Thus, the court concluded that actual intent to 
delay or hinder creditors had been established such that the spinoff 
constituted an actual fraudulent transfer under Oklahoma law.83 
Regarding constructive fraud, the court again applied the Oklahoma 
fraudulent transfer statute. The court, by considering all related 
transactions together as a single transaction, found that Tronox did not 
receive “reasonably equivalent value” in the transaction.84 The court also 
analyzed market evidence, contingent liabilities, and asset valuation.85 
While the defendants presented market evidence—including a successful 
initial public offering and an offer from a private equity firm to purchase 
Tronox’s chemical business—the court rejected the market-based 
arguments, finding that the plaintiff’s expert demonstrated that the 
numbers were inflated and “the financial statements on which the market 
relied were false and misleading.”86 The court put particular emphasis on 
valuing the environmental and tort liabilities, and it generally found the 
plaintiffs’ experts to be more credible and the liabilities to be substantial.87 
Finally, in analyzing Tronox’s business enterprise value, the court applied 
three different valuation methods to determine business enterprise value—
discounted cash flow analysis, comparable company analysis, and 
comparable transaction analysis.88 Based on numerous factors, the court 
found that Tronox was insolvent and unreasonably capitalized, and that 
the defendants reasonably should have believed that Tronox would be 
                                                                                                             
 79. Id. at 282–85. 
 80. Id. at 285–89. 
 81. Id. at 285. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 288–91. 
 84. The court found that Tronox transferred property worth $17 billion ($15.8 
billion in exploration and production assets) for only $2.6 billion in return. In re 
Tronox Inc., 503 B.R. at 291–95. 
 85. Id. at 297. 
 86. Id. at 298–99. 
 87. Id. at 309–15. 
 88. Id. at 316–20. 
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unable to pay its debts as they became due.89 Thus, constructive fraud was 
also established under Oklahoma law, and the defendants were held liable 
for billions of dollars owed to the bankruptcy estate. On January 23, 2015, 
the parties finalized a settlement agreement, wherein the defendants 
agreed to pay $5.15 billion, plus interest, to resolve the fraudulent transfer 
claims.90 
C. Successor Liability and Bankruptcy Filing Risks 
When a purchaser buys distressed assets outside of bankruptcy, the 
purchaser does not receive the assets “free and clear” of existing liens, 
claims, and encumbrances in the same manner as it would in a sale 
approved in a bankruptcy court proceeding. Instead, lien releases must be 
obtained, which may require significant diligence and expense and could 
create substantial delay. Without lien releases, a purchaser could face third 
party claims that would interfere with the purchaser’s uninhibited use and 
right to the acquired assets. 
Further, when engaging in out-of-court transactions, a party is faced 
with contractual restrictions, including anti-assignment provisions, 
consent rights, and rights of first refusal that may belong to third parties 
and may adversely impact an out-of-court transaction. Many contracts 
contain specific clauses granting third parties rights of consent or refusal 
that limit free assignability of certain assets or interests. While in the 
bankruptcy process a party need not always comply with contractual 
provisions restricting assignment, parties transacting outside of 
bankruptcy typically must comply with these provisions before 
transferring assets or interests to a third party. Such restrictive provisions 
can be problematic for a purchaser and can often disrupt the out-of-court 
sale process. 
If a seller files for bankruptcy after signing a purchase agreement but 
before closing the transaction, a purchaser may find its transaction at risk 
due to a debtor’s rights under Bankruptcy Code § 365 to reject the sale 
agreement as an executory contract. Also, if there are multiple related 
acquisition agreements, a debtor may seek to “cherry pick” acquisition 
agreements that it finds beneficial to assume and reject those it finds 
burdensome. Such cherry-picking could have the effect of materially and 
negatively affecting the overall economics of the transaction. If an 
agreement is rejected, the debtor will have no further performance 
                                                                                                             
 89. Id. at 315–24. 
 90. Press Release, The U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Historic $5.15 Billion 
Environmental and Tort Settlement with Anadarko Petroleum Corp. Goes into Effect 
(Jan. 23, 2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/historic-515-billion-
environmental-and-tort-settlement-anadarko-petroleum-corp-goes-effect-0 (last 
visited May 15, 2015, 10:30 a.m.). 




obligations, and the purchaser is entitled to assert a damages claim. In the 
event the transaction closes prior to a bankruptcy filing, a purchaser may 
also be left without enforceable warranties, representations, and 
indemnities under the terms of the agreement. Additionally, purchasers 
may find that certain payments made before closing, such as true-up 
payments or purchase price adjustments, may be challenged as avoidable 
preferences that may be recoverable by the bankruptcy estate. Tactics to 
mitigate risks in out-of-court transactions include negotiating contractual 
terms that take into account risks such as: (1) providing for a portion of 
the purchase price to be placed in escrow or otherwise reserved pending 
resolution of certain risks and contingencies; (2) obtaining liens on the 
distressed seller’s assets to secure a party’s obligations; or (3) integrating 
transaction contracts expressly and substantively to guard against a 
debtor’s ability to “cherry pick,” or reject some agreements while 
assuming others. 
II. ACQUISITIONS OF DISTRESSED ENERGY ASSETS IN BANKRUPTCY 
Given the potential risks for out-of-court transactions, a buyer 
considering a purchase of distressed assets out-of-court, alternatively, may 
consider a bankruptcy court-approved sale process. This part examines 
key facets of the options available in bankruptcy proceedings. 
A. The 363 Sale Free and Clear of Claims and Interests 
Purchasing energy assets in a bankruptcy process under Bankruptcy 
Code § 363 offers certain advantages over other types of out-of-court 
transactions. A § 363 asset sale affords the purchaser statutory protections 
and rights not found in an out-of-court transaction, typically involves less 
time, and does not require adherence to the procedural formalities 
otherwise required for a sale under a plan of reorganization. Perhaps most 
importantly, sales under Bankruptcy Code § 363 allow purchasers to take 
the assets “free and clear” of most claims, liens, and other interests. 
Bankruptcy court approval is required for asset sales under 
Bankruptcy Code § 363 (as opposed to out-of-court transactions), and the 
bankruptcy court has broad discretion in deciding whether to authorize a 
Bankruptcy Code § 363 asset sale. Regular business transactions that occur 
on a day-to-day basis, however, are considered part of a debtor’s “ordinary 
course of business” and do not require bankruptcy court approval. For 
example, a natural gas exploration and production company may continue 
to sell the gas it has produced in the ordinary course of business without 
192 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IV 
 
 
notifying creditors or obtaining court approval.91 By comparison, a sale of 
all or substantially all of a debtor’s assets would constitute an “outside-
the-ordinary-course” transaction requiring notice to parties in interest and 
bankruptcy court approval.92 
In order to determine whether a particular use or sale of property falls 
within a debtor’s ordinary course of business, bankruptcy courts generally 
apply a horizontal dimension test and a vertical dimension test.93 Under 
the horizontal dimension test, bankruptcy courts look to whether the 
transaction at issue is one that would normally be entered into by similar 
businesses.94 Under the vertical dimension test, courts look to whether the 
proposed transaction exposes the debtor’s creditors to a different 
economic risk than that which would have been expected in the past (i.e., 
whether the proposed transaction is consistent with the debtor’s past 
behavior).95 
Historically, courts were reluctant to authorize asset sales in Chapter 
11 bankruptcy cases absent sufficiently compelling circumstances, under 
the rationale that Chapter 11 is designed to reorganize a debtor’s affairs, 
not liquidate its assets. Today, however, asset sales under Bankruptcy 
Code § 363 are fairly common in Chapter 11 cases. Bankruptcy courts can 
permit outside-the-ordinary-course asset sales under § 363 if the debtor 
demonstrates a sound business justification for the sale.96 Even courts that 
are more hesitant to authorize § 363 sales will permit them in certain 
situations, including those where: (1) a company’s going concern value97 
is declining and financing is contingent on a speedy sale; (2) a company 
                                                                                                             
 91. Importantly, any party with an interest in the property to be used or sold 
may petition the bankruptcy court to prohibit or condition the debtor’s use or sale 
of the property to the extent necessary to provide adequate protection of that 
party’s interest. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2012). 
 92. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1). 
 93. See In re Roth Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 952 (3rd Cir. 1992) (citing Benjamin 
Weintraub & Alan N. Resnick, The Meaning of “Ordinary Course of Business” 
Under the Bankruptcy Code—Vertical and Horizontal Analysis, 19 UCC L. J. 364 
(1987)); Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Dant and Russel, Inc. (In re Dant and Russel, 
Inc.), 853 F.2d 700, 704 (9th Cir. 1988); Braunstein v. McCabe, 571 F.3d 108, 124 
(1st Cir. 2009); Denton County Elec. Coop. v. Eldorado Ranch, Ltd. (In re Denton 
Cnty. Elec. Coop.), 281 B.R. 876, 882 n.12 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002); Sunshine 
Heifers, L.L.C. v. Moohaven Dairy, L.L.C., 13 F. Supp. 3d 770, 775 (E.D. Mich. 
2014). 
 94. In re Roth Am., Inc., 975 F.2d at 953. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See, e.g., In re Georgetown Steel Co., L.L.C., 306 B.R. 549, 555 (Bankr. 
D.S.C. 2004) (“Courts often review a debtor’s use, sale or lease of property of the 
estate outside of the ordinary course of business pursuant to the debtor’s 
demonstration of a sound business purpose.”) (citations omitted); In re Enron 
Corp., No. 01-16034, 2003 WL 1562202, at *19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2003) 
(citing In re Chateaugay Corp., 973 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
 97. A “going concern value” is the value of a company as an ongoing entity, as 
contrasted to the value of the company’s assets were the company to be liquidated. 




would otherwise lose valuable customers absent an expedited sale; (3) a 
company’s business depends on trade credit; or (4) a company’s operating 
expenses exceed revenues.98 
While the modern trend is to use the § 363 sale process as a potential end-
goal of complex reorganizations,99 some courts will not approve such a sale if 
it is determined to be a sub rosa, or secret, plan. A sub rosa plan is a disguised 
Chapter 11 plan of reorganization designed to evade compliance with proper 
plan procedures;100 sub rosa plans are impermissible because they “short 
circuit” the Bankruptcy Code’s requirements for plan confirmation.101 As a 
result, bankruptcy courts scrutinize § 363 sales to ensure they do not 
improperly affect plan confirmation protections like creditor priorities. For 
example, the Fifth Circuit declined to authorize a proposed asset sale in In re 
Braniff Airways.102 In that case, the assets proposed to be sold were plane 
landing slots that comprised a significant portion of the debtor’s total assets.103 
Further, the sale agreement effectively established the terms of a Chapter 11 
plan by, inter alia, requiring secured creditors to vote in favor of a subsequent 
plan of reorganization and releasing all claims against the debtor.104 In 
practice, sub rosa objections are generally not successful unless the evidence 
points to a short-circuiting of the plan process by secretly establishing what 
should be terms of a plan in connection with the sale of assets. 
1. General Requirements for Sale Approval 
Under the first prong of the § 363 sale analysis, bankruptcy courts 
commonly conduct a four-factor inquiry examining: (1) whether the 
debtor has articulated a sound business purpose for the sale, (2) whether 
                                                                                                             
 98. See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Distressed Mergers and Acquisitions, 
at 50–52 (2013), available at http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs 
/WLRK.22377.13.pdf (last visited May 15, 2015, 10:32 a.m.) (hereinafter referred to 
as “Wachtell”) (citing In re Chrysler L.L.C., 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009), aff’g In re 
Chrysler L.L.C., 405 B.R. 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 
B.R. 463, 491-92 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Boston Generating, L.L.C., 440 B.R. 
302, 329 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
 99. See Jacob A. Kling, Rethinking 363 Sales, 17 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 258, 
262–94 (2012). 
 100. In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 416-18 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
2009); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff 
Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 101. In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d at 939–40. 
 102. Id. (“The debtor and the Bankruptcy Court should not be able to short 
circuit the requirements of Chapter 11 for confirmation of a reorganization plan 
by establishing the terms of the plan sub rosa in connection with the sale of 
assets.”). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  
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the offer is fair and reasonable, (3) whether adequate and reasonable notice 
has been given, and (4) whether the parties acted in good faith.105 
 
a. Respect of the Debtor’s Business Judgment 
Bankruptcy courts generally apply a “business judgment test” to 
determine whether a sound business-related purpose underlies a proposed 
outside-the-ordinary-course asset sale such that it should be authorized.106 
In assessing the soundness of a debtor’s business decision to sell its assets 
outside of the ordinary course of business, bankruptcy courts commonly 
consider factors such as: 
1) the proportionate value of the asset to the estate as a whole; 
2) the amount of time elapsed since the filing; 
3) the likelihood that a plan of reorganization will be proposed 
and confirmed in the near future; 
4) the effect of the proposed disposition on future plans of 
reorganization; 
5) the proceeds to be obtained from the disposition regarding 
appraisals of the property; 
6) which of the alternatives of use, sale, or lease the proposal 
envisions; 
7) the estate’s liquidity until confirmation of a plan; 
8) alternative sales options at the time of confirmation; and 
9) whether the assets to be sold are increasing or decreasing in 
value.107 
b. The Need to Be Fair and Reasonable 
While bankruptcy courts place great emphasis on the business 
judgment prong of the test, a debtor must also establish that the price and 
                                                                                                             
 105. In re Exaeris Inc., 380 B.R. 741, 744 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (citing In re Del. 
& Hudson Ry. Co., 124 B.R. 169, 176 (D. Del. 1991)); see also Sugarloaf Indus. & 
Mktg. Co. v. Quaker City Castings, Inc. (In re Quaker City Castings, Inc.), 2005 
Bankr. LEXIS 2211, at *22-24 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Nov. 18, 2005). 
 106. See In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1070 (2d Cir. 1983); Stephens Indus., 
Inc. v. McClung, 789 F.2d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Quaker City Castings, Inc., 
2005 Bankr. LEXIS 2211, at *22–24. 
 107. See, e.g., In re Cont'l Air Lines, Inc., 780 F.2d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(citing In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1071). 




terms of the sale agreement are “fair and reasonable.”108 Whether the terms 
of a proposed sale are fair and reasonable depends on the circumstances of 
each case.109 A debtor properly marketing or “shopping” assets will 
increase the likelihood that a bankruptcy court will find a proposed sale 
price to be fair and reasonable. Further, while the Bankruptcy Code does 
not require sale by auction, debtors frequently sell their assets by auction 
because the auction process is considered an effective means of 
effectuating a fair arm’s-length transaction.110 Notably, if an insider or 
fiduciary of the debtor is purchasing assets from the debtor, bankruptcy 
courts apply a heightened standard of review, discussed infra, to ensure 
the sale price is fair and reasonable.111 
 
c. The Need for Adequate and Reasonable Notice of the Sale 
In addition to the requirements that a sale be fair, reasonable, and 
supported by a sound business justification, the debtor must further be sure 
to provide proper and adequate notice of its proposed asset sale. 
Bankruptcy courts will not authorize a sale under Bankruptcy Code § 363 
unless the debtor provides sufficient notice to parties in interest, such that 
all parties have a meaningful opportunity to respond and object to the 
proposed sale, if warranted.112 As a general rule of thumb, a debtor must 
give creditors and parties in interest at least twenty-one days’ notice of the 
proposed sale, unless the court shortens the required notice period.113 
d. The Need for Good Faith of the Debtor and Prospective 
Buyer 
Lastly, the asset sale must be proposed in “good faith.” When 
assessing the good faith of a proposed sale, bankruptcy courts commonly 
                                                                                                             
 108. See, e.g., In re Reese, No. 06–50133–RLJ–11, 2006 WL 6544094, at *4–5 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 11, 2006). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Rule 6004(f) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy 
Rules”) provides that sales not in the ordinary course of business may be either by 
private sale or by public auction. FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004(f). 
 111. In re Mallory Co., 214 B.R. 834, 837–38 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997). 
 112. See, e.g., In re Naron & Wagner, Chartered, 88 B.R. 85, 89 (Bankr. D. Md. 
1988) (The debtor “must provide notice to all parties in interest . . . to [sufficiently] 
inform [them] of the anticipated impact of the sale on debtor’s business and/or 
anticipated plan. For example, . . . the notice should contain enough information to 
alert interested parties that this is their last chance to be heard.”). 
 113. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2) (requiring at least twenty-one days’ notice 
of a proposed sale of property of the estate “other than in the ordinary course of 
business, unless the court for cause shown shortens the time or directs another method 
of giving notice”). Some local rules vary the required notice period. 
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scrutinize the conduct of both the debtor and the prospective buyer.114 
While there is no bright-line test for “good faith,” bankruptcy courts 
generally look for signs of fraud, collusion, and unfair bidding procedures 
in connection with a proposed sale. If an “insider” or a fiduciary is 
involved, bankruptcy courts apply a heightened standard of scrutiny and 
focus on whether the insider or fiduciary received special treatment with 
respect to the proposed transaction.115 Accordingly, if a Bankruptcy Code 
§ 363 sale involves an insider or a fiduciary of the debtor, the parties to 
the transaction should disclose to the bankruptcy court the nature of the 
relationship between the parties, the circumstances surrounding the 
negotiation process, and the process by which the debtor ultimately 
determined the price and terms of the sale to be fair and reasonable. 
2. Free and Clear Sales Requirements 
As mentioned supra, unlike asset sales outside of bankruptcy, a 
primary benefit of conducting asset sales pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 
363 is that the assets are sold “free and clear” of existing liens and 
encumbrances.116 While there are several limitations to a free and clear 
sale, and while the Bankruptcy Code’s protections are not absolute, 
purchasers of a debtor’s assets with bankruptcy court approval are 
afforded substantial protection from a debtor’s liabilities. 
Under Bankruptcy Code § 363(f), a trustee or debtor in possession 
may sell property free and clear of any interest of any entity other than the 
estate in such property, provided that at least one of five conditions is 
established: 
                                                                                                             
 114. See Wachtell, supra note 98 at 58; In re Boston Generating, L.L.C., 440 
B.R. at 330. 
 115. See In re Mallory Co., 214 B.R. at 837–38. 
 116. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012). 




1) applicable non-bankruptcy law permits the sale of such 
property free and clear of such interest;117 
2) such entity consents; 
3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is 
to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on 
such property;118 
4) such interest is in bona fide dispute;119 or 
                                                                                                             
 117. Relevant non-bankruptcy law will typically be applicable state law. See In re 
Curry, 347 B.R. 596, 600 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 2006) (“When disputes over whether 
property is included in the estate arise, the bankruptcy court will determine the status 
and nature of the debtor’s ownership or interest in the disputed property under 
applicable non-bankruptcy law, often state law, as of the time the bankruptcy petition 
was filed.”) (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979)). There is 
currently a split in authority as to whether state foreclosure law may constitute 
“applicable non-bankruptcy law” under § 363(f)(1). Compare In re Jaussi, 488 B.R. 
456, 458–59 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2013) (limiting scope of “applicable non-bankruptcy 
law” under § 363(f)(1) to legal options available to the debtor rather than to outside 
parties); Dishi & Sons v. Bay Condos L.L.C., 510 B.R. 696, 709–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(limiting scope of provision to voluntary property transfers rather than New York 
foreclosure law); with In re Dulgerian, No. 06-10203 (JKF), 2008 WL 220523, at *4 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2008) (citing to Pennsylvania foreclosure law to legitimate 
the free and clear sale of property to satisfy a mortgage while extinguishing an 
easement granted subject to the mortgage); In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, L.L.C., 
No. 12-60041, 2015 WL 3767099, at *1 (D. Mont. June 16. 2015) (Montana 
foreclosure law constitutes “applicable nonbankruptcy law” for purposes of § 
363(f)(1)); In re Wrangell Seafoods, Inc., No. K09-00012-DMD, 2009 WL 8478297, 
at *1 (Bankr. D. Alaska March 9, 2009) (Alaska foreclosure law constitutes 
“applicable nonbankruptcy law” for purposes of § 363(f)(1)); In re F.F. Station L.L.C., 
No. 6:07-BK-00575-ABB, 2007 WL 4898367, at *2 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2007) 
(allowing sale of mortgaged property under § 363(f)(1) and (4) free and clear of 
leasehold interests). 
 118. Courts are split as to whether “value” as used here refers to the economic 
value or the face value of the liens. Most courts have concluded that the “aggregate 
value” refers to economic value. In re Boston Generating, L.L.C., 440 B.R. at 332 
(“As this Court held [previously], section 363(f)(3) should be interpreted to mean that 
‘the price must be equal to or greater than the aggregate value of the liens asserted 
against it, not their amount.’”) (emphasis original, internal citations omitted); In re 
WK Lang Holdings, L.L.C., 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 5224, at *26-27 (Bankr. D. Kan. 
Dec. 11, 2013); but see Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, L.L.C.), 
391 B.R. 25, 40-41 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2008) (“[W]e join those courts . . . that hold that 
§ 363(f)(3) does not authorize the sale free and clear of a lienholder’s interest if the 
price of the estate property is equal to or less than the aggregate amount of all claims 
held by creditors who hold a lien or security interest in the property being sold.”). 
 119. A “bona fide dispute” requires the interest to be in dispute on a fundamental 
level, and not simply contested on a peripheral or tangential matter. See In re 
Restaurant Assocs., L.L.C., No. 1:06CV53, 2007 WL 951849, at *9 (N.D. W. Va. 
Mar. 28, 2007). 
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5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable 
proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such interest.120 
The Bankruptcy Code does not define “interest” for purposes of 
Bankruptcy Code § 363(f). While some bankruptcy courts narrowly 
interpret “interest” to mean an in rem interest in property (e.g., a lien), 
most apply an expansive reading of the term and have found it to include 
liens, claims, and other encumbrances, except for “restrictions of record 
that run with the land.”121 
A sale free and clear under Bankruptcy Code § 363 requires that 
adequate protection be provided to parties with interests in the assets being 
sold.122 Congress intended adequate protection to guard against loss in 
value of a secured creditor’s interest in property of the bankruptcy estate 
during the bankruptcy case.123 Adequate protection is based on the 
fundamental principle that secured creditors should not be deprived of the 
benefit of their bargain. The burden of proof as to adequate protection is 
on the debtor; however, the entity asserting an interest in the asset or assets 
to be sold has the burden of proof regarding its interest in such property.124 
In many free and clear sales, as a form of adequate protection, the interests 
will attach to the sale proceeds with the same validity, extent, and priority 
as such interests had when they encumbered the assets prior to the sale.125 
Bankruptcy Code § 363 also requires notice of the sale to be sent to 
all creditors and parties who have liens or other interests in the assets being 
sold.126 This notice requirement is expansive as it applies to the often 
numerous oil and gas counterparties, oil and gas lessors, secured and 
unsecured creditors, and regulatory authorities with interests in the assets. 
                                                                                                             
 120. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). 
 121. In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 289 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(finding that the trend seems to be toward a more expansive reading of “interests 
in property” that “encompasses other obligations that may flow from ownership 
of the property”); Silverman v. Ankari (In re Oyster Bay Cove), 196 B.R. 251, 
256 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that “the order to sell ‘free and clear’ has no [e]ffect 
on the dedication of the road and storm drain, which are easements that run with 
the land”) (emphasis in original). 
 122. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2012). 
 123. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 338–340 (1977); In re DeSardi, 340 B.R. 790, 
796–97 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006); In re Bovino, 496 B.R. 492, 502 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 2013) (citing United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 
484 U.S. 365, 370–71 (1998)). 
 124. 11 U.S.C. § 363(p). 
 125. See, e.g., In re Sears Methodist Ret. Sys., No. 14-32821-11, 2015 Bankr. 
LEXIS 709, at *9–11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2015); In re Amidee Capital 
Group, Inc., No. 10-20041, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 5702, at *10 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
Oct. 19, 2010). 
 126. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2). 




a. Treatment of Easements and Covenants 
Bankruptcy Code § 541 defines property of the estate to include, inter 
alia, “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case.”127 Easements and covenants conveyed to 
third parties that run with the land (i.e., that are properly recorded in the 
relevant real property records) are not considered property of the debtor’s 
estate under § 541 because the debtor does not hold a legal or equitable 
interest therein. As a result, a sale “free and clear of liens and other 
interests” generally does not impact restrictions of record that run with the 
land.128 
As bankruptcy courts have noted, Bankruptcy Code § 363(f) is “not 
intended to sever easements and other non-monetary property interests 
that are created by substantive state law.”129 Accordingly, absent an 
easement owner’s consent or a bona fide dispute regarding the easement, 
the Bankruptcy Code usually does not allow parties to utilize § 363(f) to 
sell property “free and clear” of a properly recorded easement or 
covenant.130 However, the Fifth Circuit recently appeared to leave open 
the possibility that a § 363 sale could be free and clear of covenants 
running with the land if the bankruptcy court determined that one of the 
elements of Bankruptcy Code § 363(f) is met.131 The real property records 
                                                                                                             
 127. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). 
 128. In re Oyster Bay Cove, Ltd., 196 B.R. at 256. 
 129. Id. at 255. 
 130. See id. at 256. 
 131. Newco Energy v. Energytec, Inc. (In re Energytec, Inc.), 739 F.3d 215, 
225–26 (5th Cir. 2013) (determining that a right to a “transportation fee” for use 
of a gas pipeline system constituted a covenant running with the land, and the 
bankruptcy court should give the initial answer as to “what constitutes a 
qualifying legal or equitable proceeding for purposes of Section 363(f)(5)” to 
determine whether the land may be sold free and clear of such interests pursuant 
to Bankruptcy Code § 363(f)(5)). These issues, raised in the context of motions to 
reject executory contracts, have recently become of keen interest and importance 
in pending upstream bankruptcy cases. On March 8, 2016, the Bankruptcy Court 
for the Southern District of New York in In re Sabine Oil and Gas Corp., et al., 
Case No. 15-11835 [Docket No. 872], issued a ruling granting a motion by an 
upstream debtor to reject midstream gathering contracts, which the midstream 
counterparties argued contain covenants running with the land that could not be 
rejected under Bankruptcy Code § 365. Although the Court granted the rejection 
motion, in light of the Second Circuit’s ruling in Orion Pictures Corp. v. 
Showtime Networks, Inc., 4 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1993), which requires that a 
disputed legal issue between the parties be decided in an adversary proceeding 
and not in the context of a contested matter, it issued only a non-binding ruling 
that the dedications in the midstream contracts did not constitute covenants 
running with the land or equitable servitudes under Texas law because the 
requirements of privity and touching and concerning the land were not satisfied. 
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re 
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in the county in which the land is located will typically disclose any 
recorded easements and covenants on the property that will continue to 
burden the target assets after a sale. 
 
b. Successor Liability and Future Claims 
In addition to the foregoing limitations, successor liability issues may 
arise in free and clear energy asset sales. In the bankruptcy context, 
purchasers are usually protected from liability to existing tort claimants, 
provided such claimants had notice of and an opportunity to participate in 
the bankruptcy case.132 This policy encourages purchasers of energy assets 
to participate in bankruptcy sales, thereby maximizing value received by 
the estate. Moreover, this policy treats similarly situated creditors equally 
by prohibiting existing creditors from prosecuting claims against a 
debtor’s successor. 
However, unlike the treatment of existing tort claimants, bankruptcy 
courts continue to debate whether or not they have the jurisdiction or the 
power to protect purchasers of distressed assets from future claims (i.e., 
claims that arise post-petition as a result of the debtor’s prepetition 
conduct).133 In general, bankruptcy courts faced with the issue of successor 
liability typically look to whether the future claimants have “claims” 
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, such that their claims would 
fall within the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction.134 
Bankruptcy courts generally employ one of three tests to determine 
whether a future claimant has a prepetition claim against a debtor: (1) the 
conduct test; (2) the prepetition relationship test; and (3) the Piper test. 
                                                                                                             
Quicksilver Resources, Inc. et al., Case No. 15-10585, took a similar motion 
under advisement on March 4, 2016, though in that case, the rejection motion 
follows and relates to a court-approved sale of substantially all of the Debtors’ 
assets free and clear of liens, claims, and encumbrances, which complicates the 
issue of how and if rejection impacts covenants running with the land in GPAs, 
which already were subjected to the free and clear sale of assets under Bankruptcy 
Code § 363. A decision in Quicksilver is expected this month. 
 132. See Am. Living Sys. v. Bonapfel (In re All Am. of Ashburn, Inc.), 56 
B.R. 186, 190–91 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986); In re White Motor Credit Corp., 75 
B.R. 944, 950–51 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re Pan Am. Hosp. Corp., 364 B.R. 
832, 838 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007); In re Remember Enters., 425 B.R. 757, 764–65 
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2010). 
 133. See, e.g., Mooney Aircraft Corp. v. Foster (In re Mooney Aircraft, Inc.), 
730 F.2d 367, 375 (5th Cir. 1984); Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 
159, 163-64 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that the bankruptcy court did not have 
jurisdiction to enjoin future tort claimants); In re Dura Auto. Sys., No. 06-11202, 
2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2764, at *265–68 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 15, 2007). 
 134. See In re White Motor Credit Corp., 75 B.R. at 950–51; Morgan Olson 
L.L.C. v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus.), 467 B.R. 694, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012); In re Dura Auto. Sys., No. 06-11202, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2764, at *265–
68; In re Desa Holdings Corp., 353 B.R. 419, 426–27 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006). 




Under the conduct test, a claim arises when the debtor’s conduct giving 
rise to the claim occurred.135 Under the prepetition relationship test, the 
claimant’s relationship with the debtor must have existed prior to the filing 
of the bankruptcy petition.136 The Piper test is a hybrid test combining both 
the conduct test and the prepetition relationship test to determine whether 
a tort victim holds a claim.137 
3. Other 363 Sale Considerations 
In addition to the foregoing § 363 sale considerations, other issues 
particular to in-court sales are worthy of note, including appeals and 
statutory mootness, bidder collusion, partitioning of co-owned property, 
and issues of interest to intellectual property licensees. These topics are 
addressed in the subparts that follow infra. 
 
a. Appeals and Statutory Mootness 
Bankruptcy Code § 363(m) provides that an authorized sale that is 
subsequently reversed or modified on appeal remains valid if the purchase 
was made in good faith and the sale was not stayed pending appeal.138 
Accordingly, the purchaser is generally protected from reversal of a sale, 
                                                                                                             
 135. See Grady v. A.H. Robins Co. (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 839 F.2d 198, 
202–03 (4th Cir. 1988); Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1275 (5th 
Cir. 1994); In re Huffy Corp., 424 B.R. 295, 304 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010); 
Morgan Olson, L.L.C.. v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus.), 445 B.R. 243, 
251 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Under the conduct test, a right to payment arises 
when the conduct giving rise to the alleged liability occurred. In other words, all 
of the acts constituting the tort other than the manifestation of injury had occurred 
prior to the petition date.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 136. See In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619, 622–24 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
1994); In re Grumman Olson Indus., 445 B.R. at 251 n.8 (“Under the pre-petition 
relationship test, only individuals with ‘some type of prepetition relationship with 
the Debtor’ hold claims.”) (internal citations omitted); Lemelle, 18 F.3d at 1276; 
Huffy, 424 B.R. at 304. 
 137. Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Piper Aircraft, 
Corp.), 58 F.3d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1995) (adopting a two-part test—the “Piper” 
test—that combined the conduct and pre-petition relationship tests to determine 
whether a tort victim holds a “claim”); see also In re Grumman Olson Indus., 445 
B.R. at 253. 
 138. 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2012). The purchaser’s knowledge of the pendency of 
an appeal is irrelevant. 
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so long as the purchaser acted in good faith and the other party failed to 
obtain a stay.139 
Since the Bankruptcy Code does not define “good faith” for the 
purposes of § 363(m), courts typically apply traditional equity principles 
to guide their findings as to good faith in sale orders.140 Examples of 
                                                                                                             
 139. See, e.g., Licensing by Paolo v. Sinatra (In re Gucci), 105 F.3d 837, 839–40 
(2d Cir. 1997) (“Though [Bankruptcy Code § 363(m)] in terms states only that an 
appellate court may not ‘affect the validity’ of a sale of property to a good faith 
purchaser pursuant to an unstayed authorization, and can even be read to imply that 
an appeal from an unstayed order may proceed for purposes other than affecting 
validity of the sale, courts have regularly ruled that the appeal is moot.”); SBA v. 
XACT Telesolutions, Inc. (In re XACT Telesolutions, Inc.), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
621, at *16–18 (D. Md. Jan. 10, 2006) (“Once a bankruptcy sale has been 
consummated, [Bankruptcy Code] § 363(m) deprives courts of jurisdiction to review 
the sale except on the limited issue of whether the sale was made to a good faith 
purchaser.”); Cargill, Inc. v. Charter Int’l Oil Co. (In re The Charter Co.), 829 F.2d 
1054, 1056 (11th Cir. 1987); but see In re PW, L.L.C., 391 B.R. at 35–37 (“Clear 
Channel”) (narrowly construing Bankruptcy Code § 363(m) to apply only to the 
overall sale and not to the specific terms thereof). The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s 
holding in Clear Channel remains controversial because it interprets Bankruptcy 
Code § 363(m) to permit reversal of the free and clear terms of a sale. The Clear 
Channel holding ignored prior Ninth Circuit authority applying Bankruptcy Code § 
363(m) to a free and clear sale under Bankruptcy Code § 363(f) in In re Robert L. 
Helms Const. & Dev. Co., Inc., 110 F.3d 1470, 1475 (9th Cir. 1997), and the Clear 
Channel decision has been heavily criticized by courts in the Ninth Circuit and in other 
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors v. Anderson Senior 
Living Prop., L.L.C. (In re Nashville Living, L.L.C.), 407 B.R. 222, 229–32 (B.A.P. 
6th Cir. 2009) (stating that “Clear Channel cited no case law for its conclusion and 
the overwhelming weight of authority disagrees with its holding that the [Bankruptcy 
Code] § 363(m) stay does not apply to the ‘free and clear’ aspect of a sale under 
[Bankruptcy Code] § 363(f)”); United States v. Asset Based Res. Group, L.L.C., 612 
F.3d 1017, 1019 n.2 (8th Cir. 2010) (“This court has consistently applied this [§ 
363(m) mootness] principle in the bankruptcy context. [Appellant], relying on [Clear 
Channel], contends that [Bankruptcy Code §] 363(m) moots only appeals challenging 
transfers of title, not appeals challenging other aspects of court-approved sales. This 
distinction is not persuasive.”) (internal citations omitted); Ace Fire Underwriters Ins. 
Co v. Plant Insulation Co. (In re Plant Insulation Co.), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189155, 
at *17–19 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2012) (rejecting Clear Channel and “adopting the more 
persuasive, latter line of authority” to find that “[b]ecause the designation is ‘integral’ 
to the sale authorized under [Bankruptcy Code] § 363(b), the doctrine of statutory 
mootness under [Bankruptcy Code] § 363(m) applies to this appeal, barring a showing 
by appellants that the purchase was not consummated in good faith”); In re Thorpe 
Insulation Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38879, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011) 
(“Clear Channel does support Appellants’ position, but it has been widely criticized 
by courts and commentators and is generally unpersuasive.”). 
 140. See In re Tempo Tech. Corp., 202 B.R. 363, 367 (D. Del. 1996) (“Neither 
the Bankruptcy Code nor the Bankruptcy Rules define ‘good faith.’ In construing 
this phrase, courts have therefore borrowed from traditional equitable principles, 
holding that the concept of ‘good faith’ speaks to the integrity of a party’s conduct 
in the course of the bankruptcy sale proceedings.”) (internal citations omitted). 




conduct lacking good faith include fraud, collusion, and attempts to gain 
grossly unfair advantages over other bidders in the sale process.141 
 
b. Collusion by Bidders Prohibited 
Bankruptcy Code § 363(n) permits a trustee to: (1) avoid a sale if the 
price was controlled by an agreement among potential bidders, or (2) 
recover from a collusive party to the extent the value of the property sold 
exceeds the actual sale price.142 A trustee may also recover any costs, 
attorneys’ fees, or expenses incurred in avoiding a collusive sale or 
recovering funds from a collusive party.143 Importantly, Bankruptcy Code 
§ 363(n) also authorizes a bankruptcy court to assess punitive damages 
against a collusive party in favor of the estate if such party willfully 
engaged in collusive behavior.144 
For purposes of § 363(n), a collusive agreement may be oral and need 
not take the form of an explicit written contract, but the agreement must 
be made with the intent to control the sale price, rather than merely 
affecting the price as an unintended consequence.145 The mere existence 
of a joint bid or cooperation among bidders does not itself evidence bad 
faith or amount to collusive bidding under Bankruptcy Code § 363(n).146 
Bidders may choose to work together or split up assets in a joint bid in 
order to complete a large transaction. Courts have focused, in determining 
the good faith of bidders, on whether acts were disclosed to the bankruptcy 
court.147 
                                                                                                             
 141. Id. 
 142. 11 U.S.C. § 363(n). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Lone Star Indus. v. Compania Naviera Perez Companc, 
S.A.C.F.I.M.F.A. (In re New York Trap Rock Corp.), 42 F.3d 747, 752 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(“The influence on the sale price must be an intended objective of the agreement, and 
not merely an unintended consequence, for the agreement among potential bidders to 
come within the prohibition of § 363(n).”); See also Sunnyside Land, L.L.C. v. Sims 
(In re Sunnyside Timber, L.L.C.), 413 B.R. 352, 363 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2009). 
 146. See, e.g., In re Edwards, 228 B.R. 552, 563–66 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998). 
 147. See, e.g., Kabro Assocs. v. Colony Hill Assocs. (In re Colony Hill 
Assocs.), 111 F.3d 269, 277 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Many courts ruling on challenges to 
a purchaser’s good faith status have focused on whether the acts about which the 
appellant complained were disclosed to the bankruptcy court.”); In re Sasson 
Jeans, Inc., 90 B.R. 608, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (explaining that the court was “hard 
pressed” to determine bad faith when a challenged relationship between bidder 
and debtor “was fully disclosed to the Bankruptcy Court”). 
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c. Partitioning (Co-Ownership) 
Energy assets often have multiple owners with subdivided or co-
owned interests. In certain circumstances, pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 
363(h), a debtor may sell co-owned assets, including the co-owner’s 
interests, without the co-owner’s consent if the debtor accounts to the co-
owner for its share of the proceeds.148 Bankruptcy Code §§ 363(h) and 
363(i) codify the right of the debtor or trustee, proceeding from the 
debtor’s position as one of the joint tenants or tenants in common, to cause 
the liquidation of co-owned property when partition is impracticable and 
when the co-owner will not exercise its right of first purchase.149 
Importantly, Bankruptcy Code § 363(i) gives the co-owner a statutory 
right of first refusal in such a sale,150 and Bankruptcy Rule 7001 requires 
an adversary proceeding to sell a co-owner’s interests in assets.151 An 
exception to this general rule precludes a debtor from selling co-owned 
assets used in the production, transmission, or distribution for sale of 
electric energy, natural gas, or synthetic gas for heat, light, or power.152 
d. Licensees of Intellectual Property 
Bankruptcy Code § 365(n) provides special statutory protection for 
licensees of rights to intellectual property,153 allowing them to retain their 
rights under intellectual property agreements as those rights existed 
immediately preceding the filing of the bankruptcy case.154 Thus, licensees 
maintain “squatter’s rights” regardless of a debtor’s decision to reject the 
executory intellectual property agreement and sell its intellectual property 
free and clear of the licensee’s interest.155 
                                                                                                             
 148. 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (2012). 
 149. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Anderson Senior Living 
Prop., L.L.C. (In re Nashville Senior Living, L.L.C.), 407 B.R. at 222, 227 (B.A.P. 
6th Cir. 2009). 
 150. 11 U.S.C. § 363(i). 
 151. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(3). 
 152. 11 U.S.C. § 363(h)(4). There is limited case law interpreting this provision as 
a safeguard for co-owners to prevent the sale of property without their consent. 
 153. The Bankruptcy Code defines “intellectual property” to include, to the extent 
protected by applicable non-bankruptcy law: (i) trade secrets; (ii) inventions, 
processes, designs, or plants protected under Title 35; (iii) patent applications; (iv) 
plant varieties; (v) works of authorship under Title 17; and (vi) mask works protected 
under Chapter 9 of Title 17. 11 U.S.C. § 101(35)(A). 
 154. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n). 
 155. See, e.g., TMC AeroSpace, Inc. v. Joseph (In re Ice Mgmt. Sys.), No. 14-
1046, 2014 WL 6892739, at *2 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Dec. 8, 2014) (holding that “a sale 
free and clear of [a licensee’s] rights under § 363(f) was an impermissible impairment 
of its elected license rights under § 365(n)”). 




For example, in In re Dynamic Tooling Systems, Inc., a Chapter 11 
debtor sought to sell its assets, including intellectual property, free and 
clear of all liens, claims, and interests, pursuant to a creditor’s proposed 
plan of reorganization.156 A licensee of the debtor’s intellectual property 
elected to continue to use the licensed intellectual property.157 While the 
creditor proposing the plan assured that the “free and clear” language 
proposed in the sale order would not bar the licensee’s right to use the 
intellectual property, the bankruptcy court was not satisfied.158 The court 
applied the adequate protection requirement under Bankruptcy Code § 
363(e)159 as grounds for ordering that the sale be subject to the licensee’s 
rights in the debtor’s intellectual property.160 
B. The 363 Sale Mechanics and Procedures 
The complexities particular to the necessary mechanics and 
procedures applicable to § 363 sales include those related to the marketing 
process, stalking horse bids, break-up fees, bidding procedures, and the 
negotiation of asset purchase agreements, which include many highly 
negotiated provisions. The details of these § 363 sale aspects are discussed 
in this section. 
1. The Marketing Process 
As part of the initial marketing process, sellers often utilize 
independent financial advisors, such as investment banks or consulting 
firms, to assess the value of assets to be sold and to test the marketplace 
for potential buyers. The marketing process helps to determine a fair and 
reasonable sale price, and it attracts as many potential buyers as possible. 
Moreover, a transparent marketing process helps to ensure the integrity of 
the sale and maximize value for the debtor’s estate. 
As discussed supra, where a debtor has not effectively marketed the 
assets sought to be sold in a Bankruptcy Code § 363 sale, a bankruptcy 
court may consider such action to be evidence of a lack of good faith,161 
                                                                                                             
 156. In re Dynamic Tooling Sys., Inc., 349 B.R. 847, 855 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. The Bankruptcy Code provides that, upon a timely request from a party 
that has an interest in property proposed to be used, sold, or leased, the court “shall 
prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide adequate 
protection of such interest.” 11 U.S.C. § 363(e). 
 160. In re Dynamic Tooling Sys., 349 B.R. at 856. Issues regarding assumption 
and assignment of certain intellectual property rights are discussed infra. 
 161. See, e.g., In re Bidermann Indus. U.S.A., Inc., 203 B.R. 547, 549–53 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Boston Generating, L.L.C., 440 B.R. at 323–30. 
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particularly when the buyer is an insider or has inside connections to the 
potential sale. In contrast, when a transparent and robust marketing 
process has occurred, a bankruptcy court is more likely to find that a sale 
was fair.162 
2. Stalking Horse and Break-Up Fees 
“Stalking horse” is a term used to describe the initial prospective 
purchaser of a debtor’s assets. It may be that a stalking horse emerges and 
engages in negotiations with the debtor before the debtor files for 
bankruptcy, or a stalking horse may be found post-petition during the 
marketing process. To invoke the powers and protections of the 
Bankruptcy Code, particularly those set forth in Bankruptcy Code § 363, 
the stalking horse may insist that the asset sale transpire in the bankruptcy 
forum. 
The stalking horse typically spends considerable time performing due 
diligence on distressed assets and negotiating with the debtor to obtain 
satisfactory purchase terms. A stalking horse enjoys the distinct advantage 
of having access to diligence information early in the process, which 
enables it to make an initial bid on the assets. Given the time and energy 
expended by the stalking horse in preliminary negotiations for the debtor’s 
assets and the threat of another buyer overbidding it at auction, the stalking 
horse may require a break-up fee in the event that it is not chosen as the 
successful bidder at auction. By reimbursing the stalking horse for 
transaction costs incurred in performing due diligence and in negotiating 
the terms of the asset purchase agreement and the bidding procedures,163 
break-up fees tend to: (1) encourage the stalking horse to make a binding 
offer; (2) encourage competitive bidding by evidencing the stalking 
horse’s view of the value of the assets; (3) set a floor early in the sale 
process indicating the “worst case” outcome of the sale process; and (4) 
create momentum toward consummating a sale.164 Depending on the size 
of the transaction, a break-up fee can generally range from three to five 
percent of the gross sale price. 
                                                                                                             
 162. In re Boston Generating, L.L.C., 440 B.R. at 323–30. 
 163. See In re APP Plus, Inc., 223 B.R. 870, 874 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998); U.S. 
Trustee v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (In re Bethlehem Steel Corp.), No. 02 Civ. 2854 
(MBM), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12909, at *27–28 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2003); 
Canatxx Gas Storage Ltd. v. Silverhawk Capital Partners, L.L.C., No. H-06-1330, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37803, at *17–19 (S.D. Tex. May 8, 2008). 
 164. See In re APP Plus, Inc., 223 B.R. at 874. 




The permissibility of break-up fees falls within the discretion of the 
bankruptcy court.165 Some bankruptcy courts apply the business judgment 
rule in upholding break-up fees, requiring the debtor’s inclusion of a break-
up fee in an asset purchase agreement to be based upon an informed, good 
faith business decision.166 However, if a buyer is an insider of the debtor, a 
bankruptcy court may apply higher scrutiny to a break-up fee.167 Bankruptcy 
courts focus on ensuring that Bankruptcy Code § 363 sales are in the best 
interest of the estate.168 Bankruptcy courts that disfavor break-up fees 
generally view them as an unnecessary expense for the estate that may chill 
bidding,169 and some argue that increasing the availability of information and 
standardizing bidding procedures would be a better approach.170 
Among the relevant factors that courts consider when determining 
whether to approve a break-up fee are whether: 
1) the fee requested is aligned with the policy of maximizing the 
value of the debtor’s estate; 
2) the underlying negotiated agreement constitutes an arm’s-
length transaction; 
3) any of the debtor’s secured or unsecured creditors have 
objected to the break-up fee; 
                                                                                                             
 165. See, e.g., In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP, 594 F.3d 200, 210 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (holding that “[t]he Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion when 
it concluded that an award of a break-up fee was not necessary to preserve the 
value of the estate”). 
 166. See, e.g., Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 579 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(holding a $29 million termination fee to be protected by the business judgment rule 
where the fee was not shown to be unreasonable in relation to a $2.5 billion 
transaction); In re ASARCO L.L.C., 441 B.R. 813, 825–33 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
 167. See, e.g., In re Bidermann Indus. U.S.A., Inc., 203 B.R. 547, 551 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1997) (explaining that “sales to [insiders] in chapter 11 cases are not per se 
prohibited, but [they] are necessarily subjected to heightened scrutiny because they 
are rife with the possibility of abuse”) (citing In re Wingspread Corp., 92 B.R. 87 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 168. See, e.g., In re Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 166 B.R. 908, 912 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 
1994). 
 169. See, e.g., In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 186 B.R. 98, 101–06 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) 
(finding that a break-up fee was not in the best interests of the estate); In re Am. W. 
Airlines, Inc., 166 B.R. at 910–14 (stating that the appropriate standard is not the 
business judgment rule, but whether the break-up fee is in the best interests of the 
debtor, creditors, and equity holders); In re Beth Isr. Hosp. Ass’n, No. 06-16186 
(NLW), 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2386, at *31–42 (Bankr. D.N.J. July 12, 2007). 
 170. See In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 186 B.R. at 103–04. 
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4) the break-up fee comprises a fair and reasonable portion of the 
proposed purchase price; 
5) the size of the break-up fee is so significant that it imposes a 
chilling effect on competing bidders; 
6) available safeguards exist that are beneficial to the debtor’s 
estate; and 
7) the break-up fee imposes a substantial adverse impact on 
unsecured creditors.171 
3. Bidding Procedures and Key Sale Process Steps and Deadlines 
Both bankruptcy courts and debtors generally favor asset sales by 
auction over private sales because the auction process, although not 
without its costs, generally yields the greatest value for a debtor’s assets, 
and it usually produces a fair arm’s-length transaction. Before an auction 
takes place, a debtor typically files and seeks court approval of proposed 
bidding and auction procedures. If the bankruptcy court approves the 
bidding procedures, the parties typically will serve a transaction notice on 
parties in interest and establish a timeline for certain events leading up to 
the auction. 
Bidding procedures are highly negotiated and are often crafted based 
on the circumstances of each case. Examples of common terms in bidding 
procedures include: 
1) a deadline by which parties must notify the debtor of their interest 
in the debtor’s assets; 
2) a deadline by which a draft of the form of asset purchase 
agreement is distributed to potential qualified bidders; 
3) a deadline for potential qualified bidders to submit 
a) an executed confidentiality agreement acceptable to the 
debtor, and 
b) financial statements acceptable to the debtor, demonstrating 
the potential qualified bidder’s financial capability and legal 
authority to close the proposed transaction in a timely manner; 
4) a deadline for qualified bidders to submit competing bids; 
                                                                                                             
 171. See In re Hupp Indus., Inc., 140 B.R. 191, 194 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992); 
see also In re Nashville Senior Living, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3197, at *6–10. 




5) a requirement that competing bids contain substantially similar 
terms and conditions as those set forth in the stalking horse’s 
proposed asset purchase agreement; 
6) a requirement that all bids be made in certain incremental 
amounts; 
7) a requirement that qualified bidders pay a minimum deposit; 
8) provisions regarding reasonable overbid amounts;172 
9) a date for the auction to take place; 
10)  terms that define or limit credit bidding; 
11)  provisions allowing the debtor to determine, in its discretion, the 
highest and best offer; and 
12)  a date for the hearing on the asset sale post-auction.173 
Credit bidding is a term used to describe a creditor’s authority to bid on 
assets secured by such creditor’s lien. Credit bidding is authorized under 
Bankruptcy Code § 363(k); absent an order for “cause” otherwise, that 
provision allows a secured creditor to bid at auction and, if successful, offset 
its claim against the asset purchase price.174 A secured creditor may credit bid 
in an amount up to its entire claim against the debtor, not just the secured 
                                                                                                             
 172. See In re Hupp Indus., Inc., 140 B.R. at 193 (rejecting a $300,000 overbid 
amount as “arbitrary and unreasonably high”); U.S. Trustee v. Bethlehem Steel 
Corp. (In re Bethlehem Steel Corp.), No. 02 Civ. 2853 (MBM), 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12909, at *27–28 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2003). 
 173. A bankruptcy court may refuse to authorize a sale under Bankruptcy Code 
§ 363 after an auction for a number of reasons, including submission by a 
prospective purchaser of a higher bid for the debtor’s assets after the auction is 
completed. See, e.g., Corporate Assets, Inc. v. Paloian, 368 F.3d 761, 762–63 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (upholding bankruptcy court’s decision to authorize a second auction 
when higher bid was submitted after the close of the first auction). In the event 
that a prospective buyer submits such a post-auction bid, the bankruptcy court 
may reopen the auction in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code’s fundamental 
policy of maximizing the value of a debtor’s estate for the benefit of the debtor’s 
creditors. Id. at 772–73 (“[T]he prospect of additional renumeration for the estate 
and its creditors outweighed concerns about the finality and regularity of the sale 
proceeding.”); see also Hytken v. Williams, No. H-06-2169, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 27671, at *17–18 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2007). 
 174. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2012). 
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portion of its claim.175 Accordingly, a secured creditor may credit bid and 
purchase the property encumbered by its lien by prevailing at auction, but it 
may need to pay any amount of the purchase price that exceeds the total value 
of its claim or is owed to senior lienholders.176 However, parties may seek 
agreements to limit credit bidding in certain circumstances, either by setting 
incremental thresholds for credit bidding or by prohibiting a lienholder from 
credit bidding against the stalking horse. 
4. Asset Purchase Agreements 
An asset purchase agreement (APA)—sometimes alternatively called 
a purchase and sale agreement (PSA)—is a highly complex document, 
heavily negotiated by the parties thereto. This subsection delves into 
provisions often found in an APA, including provisions allowing for the 
assignment of executory contracts and unexpired leases as well as 
provisions regarding rights of first refusal, consent rights, and preferences. 
a. Typical Provisions 
An APA is a contract between two or more parties that governs the 
terms and conditions regarding a future sale of certain specified assets. 
Bidding procedures generally require a qualified bidder to submit an APA 
to evidence its bid. Depending on the terms of the bidding procedures, 
qualified bidders may be required to submit APAs on substantially similar 
terms as the stalking horse’s APA. 
Among other provisions, APAs contain defined contract terms to be 
used in the APA, purchase and sale pricing and business terms, conditions 
to closing, representations and warranties, covenants, and termination 
provisions. APAs in energy transactions may also contain additional 
negotiated provisions, including those relating to: 
                                                                                                             
 175. See In re SunCruz Casinos, L.L.C., 298 B.R. 833, 839 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2003) 
(“[T]he plain language of [Bankruptcy Code § 363(k)] makes clear that the secured 
creditor may credit bid its entire claim, including any unsecured deficiency portion 
thereof”) (emphasis original); In re Midway Invs., Ltd., 187 B.R. 382, 391 (Bankr. 
S.D. Fla. 1995); but see In re Fisker Auto. Holdings, Inc., 510 B.R. 55, 61 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2014) (holding that “the holder of a lien the validity of which has not been 
determined . . . may not [credit] bid its lien”) (citing In re Daufuskie Island Props., 
L.L.C., 441 B.R. 60 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2010)). 
 176. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.09[3] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. 
Sommer eds., 16th ed.). 




1) purchase price adjustments; 
2) pre-closing covenants, such as maintenance of oil and gas 
assets, authorizations for expenditures (AFEs), and well 
elections; 
3) property access; 
4) indemnity by the potential buyer for liabilities caused by the 
buyer in the course of performing its due diligence; 
5) limited title representations, defect mechanics, and hold-
backs; 
6) environmental diligence terms, defect mechanics, and hold-
backs; 
7) preferential rights to purchase, rights of first refusal, and 
consent rights; 
8) anti-survival clauses; 
9) termination rights; 
10) default remedies; 
11) closing conditions; 
12) post-closing covenants; and 
13) dispute mechanics.177 
Until a debtor receives the bankruptcy court’s approval, it cannot be 
bound by an APA executed outside of the ordinary course of business, 
even if it is negotiated in connection with a Bankruptcy Code § 363 sale.178 
Once the debtor obtains a court order approving the sale, the sale may 
close. Unlike a debtor, absent an express provision in the APA to the 
contrary, a purchaser may be bound by the terms of an APA upon 
                                                                                                             
 177. See Wallander, supra note 1 at 49-50. 
 178. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2012); In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 326 B.R. 
240, 256 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that a debtor is not bound by a sale 
contract until it receives court approval). 
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execution, even if bankruptcy court approval has not yet been obtained.179 
As a result, it is not uncommon for purchasers to require that the 
effectiveness of an APA be contingent upon a satisfactory order by the 
bankruptcy court authorizing the sale. 
 
b. Assignment of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases 
Purchasers of oil and gas assets frequently seek to include in APAs a 
provision that requires certain executory contracts and unexpired leases to 
be assumed and assigned to them as part of a sale. An “executory contract” 
is commonly defined as “a contract under which the obligation of both the 
bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the 
failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material 
breach excusing the performance of the other.”180 “Unexpired leases” are 
leases of personal or real property that have not been terminated prior to 
the petition date with the specific interests defined by applicable state 
law.181 Before an executory contract or unexpired lease may be assigned, 
a debtor must first assume it. That assumption triggers the requirements in 
Bankruptcy Code § 365(b) that: (1) the debtor cures any defaults under the 
executory contract or unexpired lease to be assumed, and (2) the assignee 
provides adequate assurance of its future performance under such contract 
or lease.182 APAs frequently allocate payment of cure costs to the debtor 
or the purchaser. Notably, the Bankruptcy Code permits the assignment of 
an executory contract and unexpired lease, notwithstanding contractual 
“anti-assignment” provisions that might otherwise limit assignment.183 
Intellectual property licenses are unique executory contracts. 
Accordingly, assignment of intellectual property licenses presents 
obstacles for buyers looking to purchase intellectual property from a 
distressed energy company. While Bankruptcy Code § 365(f)(1) renders 
anti-assignment provisions generally unenforceable, Bankruptcy Code 
                                                                                                             
 179. The purchaser’s execution of an APA constitutes a binding offer that may 
be accepted by the debtor with court approval. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 24 (1981) (“An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter 
into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent 
to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.”). 
 180. Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. 
REV. 439, 460 (1973); see also Phoenix Exp., Inc. v. Yaquinto (In re Murexco Petro, 
Inc.), 15 F.3d 60, 62–63 (5th Cir. 1994); but see Chattanooga Mem’l Park v. Still (In 
re Jolly), 574 F.2d 349, 351 (6th Cir. 1978) (“The key . . . is to work backward, 
proceeding from an examination of the purposes rejection is expected to accomplish. 
If those objectives have already been accomplished, or if they can’t be accomplished 
through rejection, then the contract is not executory . . . .”). 
 181. See Brattleboro Hous. Auth. v. Stoltz (In re Stoltz), 197 F.3d 625, 629 
(2d Cir. 1999). 
 182. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(f)(2)(A), 365(b). 
 183. 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1). 




§ 365(c)(1) provides that a debtor may not assume or assign any executory 
contract or unexpired lease, if “applicable law” excuses another party to 
such contract or lease “from accepting performance from or rendering 
performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in 
possession.”184 Bankruptcy Code § 365(c)(1) has been held to prohibit the 
assignment of certain executory contracts involving intellectual property 
that contain anti-assignment provisions because such assignments are 
prohibited under federal copyright, trademark, and patent laws.185 
Indeed, a majority of courts forbid the assignment of contracts 
containing anti-assignment language by a debtor where such assignment 
is prohibited by intellectual property law.186 Courts have found non-
exclusive licenses to intellectual property to be non-assignable without the 
consent of the licensor or another party to the license.187 However, courts 
remain split as to whether an exclusive license to intellectual property is 
assignable under Bankruptcy Code § 365(c)(1) without consent of the 
licensor or another party to the contract.188 
 
c. Rights of First Refusal, Consent Rights, and Preferences 
Many energy contracts, including joint operating agreements (JOAs), 
commonly include rights of first refusal or other preferential rights that 
may be triggered by a proposed asset sale. The law lacks clarity as to 
                                                                                                             
 184. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1). 
 185. See, e.g., In re Golden Books Family Entm’t, Inc., 269 B.R. 300, 310 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2001). 
 186. See RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 
257, 262 (4th Cir. 2004); Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t (In re Catapult Entm’t), 165 
F.3d 747, 751–53 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 187. N.C.P. Mktg. Grp. v. Blanks (In re N.C.P. Mktg. Grp., Inc.), 337 B.R. 230, 
236–37 (D. Nev. 2005) (finding that federal common law, and thus Bankruptcy Code 
§ 365(c)(1), prohibits assignment of nonexclusive trademark licenses without consent 
of the licensor), aff’d, 279 F. App’x 561 (9th Cir. 2008); In re Patient Educ. Media, 
Inc., 210 B.R. 237, 240–43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Accordingly, the nonexclusive 
license is personal to the transferee, and the licensee cannot assign it to a third party 
without the consent of the copyright owner.”); Isbell v. DM Records, Inc., 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 189526, at *15 (E.D. Tex. July 16, 2013) (“[A] non-exclusive license to 
exploit a musical composition is not necessarily transferred when the rights to a master 
recording are purchased from a bankruptcy trustee. A copyright license cannot be 
transferred by the licensee without authorization of the licensor.”). 
 188. Compare Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 777–81 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that federal law bars assignment of exclusive copyright licenses “without 
the consent of the original licensor.”), with In re Golden Books Family Entm’t, 
Inc., 269 B.R. at 314–19 (holding that federal law permits assignment of exclusive 
copyright licenses regardless of licensor or counterparty consent because, “under 
applicable copyright law, exclusive licenses convey an ownership interest to the 
licensee that allows that licensee to freely transfer its rights.”). 
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whether a debtor is bound by preferential rights in an executory contract 
or unexpired lease.189 It is also unclear whether rights of first refusal or 
preferential rights to purchase can be considered executory contracts in 
and of themselves, such that a debtor may reject those rights if doing so 
would benefit the estate.190 In energy bankruptcies, a sale might be 
impacted by a third party’s preferential rights that, outside of bankruptcy, 
would be enforceable to substitute a third party as a purchaser.191 
Some courts have compared preferential rights to options to 
purchase.192 Most courts consider options to be executory until such an 
option is exercised.193 Moreover, if an option holder must tender further 
consideration or take additional steps beyond merely signing a document 
or providing notice, courts are more likely to view the option as 
executory.194 Accordingly, the preferential rights may be unenforceable if 
the agreement containing the preferential right is rejected. 
                                                                                                             
 189. 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1) (2012). 
 190. See In re Riodizio, Inc., 204 B.R. 417, 422–24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(“The case law confirms that executoriness [of option contracts] lies in the eyes 
of the beholder.”); Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. Southmark Corp. (In re Robert 
L. Helms Constr. & Dev. Co.), 139 F.3d 702, 705–06 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A better 
approach . . . is to ask whether the option requires further performance from each 
party at the time the petition is filed” and found that, typically, the option would 
not be executory because the “optionee need not exercise the option – if he does 
nothing, the option lapses without breach.”). 
 191. Such rights may be enforceable, assuming the rights are valid under state 
law and do not constitute an unenforceable absolute restriction on alienation. See 
generally Wildenstein & Co. v. Wallis, 595 N.E.2d 828, 828 (N.Y. App. 1992). 
 192. ConocoPhillips Co. v. Dahlberg, No. CIV.A. C-10-285, 2011 WL 710604, at 
*1 n.2 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2011) (“A ‘preferential right, also known as a right of first 
refusal or preemptive right, is a right granted to a party giving him or her the first 
opportunity to purchase property if the owner decides to sell it. . . . [W]hen the property 
owner gives notice of his intent to sell, the preferential right matures . . . into an 
enforceable option.’”) (quoting FWT, Inc. v. Haskin Wallace Mason Prop. Mgmt., 
L.L.P., 301 S.W.3d 787, 793 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied)); but see In 
re Robert L. Helms Constr. & Dev. Co., Inc., 139 F.3d at 706 (“Performance due only 
if the optionee chooses at his discretion to exercise the option doesn’t count [for 
executory contract analysis] unless he has chosen to exercise it.”). 
 193. In re Riodizio, Inc., 204 B.R. at 423 (“Most courts . . . consider an option 
contract to be executory although they reach their conclusions through different 
routes.”); In re Kellstrom Indus., 286 B.R. 833, 834–835 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002). 
 194. In re Abitibibowater, Inc., 418 B.R. 815, 830–31 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) 
(noting that “[n]umerous other courts have determined that contingent option 
agreements are executory when material obligations will arise on each side if the 
option is exercised.”). 




Depending on the jurisdiction and applicable state law, the recording 
of a contract containing a preferential right to purchase or right of first 
refusal may make such right a covenant running with the land, thereby 
precluding a debtor’s ability to reject it.195 However, some courts, 
including the Fifth Circuit, have held that the recordation of an option, 
even where it concerns real property, will not convert the option into a real 
property interest that is insulated from rejection.196 
C. Plan Sales 
Sale transactions may also be effectuated pursuant to a plan of 
reorganization or liquidation. While energy asset sales pursuant to 
Bankruptcy Code § 363 can be advantageous to parties because they avoid 
the expense and delay inherent in the plan process, a sale under a Chapter 
11 plan is more flexible, offers greater possibilities with respect to the sale, 
and may offer more benefits to the parties in the long run. For example, a 
plan may include compromises of claims and issuance of debt or equity 
securities, along with providing different consideration to different classes 
of claimants and interest holders.197 Additionally, a sale pursuant to a plan 
of reorganization may be less likely to trigger preferential rights to 
purchase or rights of first refusal if structured as a merger transaction or 
an equity sale, the “synthetic plan sale” discussed further infra.198 
                                                                                                             
 195. See, e.g., In re Plascencia, 354 B.R. 774, 780 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006) 
(“Virginia . . . has changed the traditional rule, so that an option is in the ‘nature 
of an interest in real estate which may be recorded and by that recordation protect 
the optionee’s interest in the real estate.’”) (quoting Springfield Eng’g Corp. v. 
Three Score Dev. Corp., 26 Va. Cir. 186, 191 (1992)). 
 196. Rivercity v. Herpel (In re Jackson Brewing Co.), 567 F.2d 618, 623–24 
(5th Cir. 1978) (finding that a lower court had the authority to allow rejection of 
a recorded option); see also In re A.J. Lane & Co., 107 B.R. 435, 438 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1989) (noting that the option “is only a contract right—the right to 
purchase—whose remedy is normally specific performance [and t]hat the world 
is given notice of this right though its appearance in a recorded deed prevents any 
other buyer from claiming the equities of an innocent third party, but that is all”). 
 197. See, e.g., In re Tropicana Entm’t, L.L.C., 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 5455, at 
*36–37 (Bankr. D. Del. May 5, 2009) (discussing resolution and compromise of 
disputed claims and interests); In re Simon, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2787, at *6–7 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. July 29, 2008) (finding that, while Bankruptcy Code § 1122(a) 
requires that all claims in a class be substantially similar, it does not require that 
all substantially similar claims be placed within the same class, and “[i]f a plan 
proponent can articulate legitimate differences among otherwise substantially 
similar claims and if separate classification is in the best interest of creditors and 
will foster reorganization, then separate classification may be proper.”); COLLIER 
ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1122.03[1][a]. 
 198. However, parties should review the applicable contracts and leases to 
determine the triggers of any preferential rights to purchase, consent rights, or 
rights of first refusal. 
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Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code § 1145 securities registration exemption 
provides more flexibility to use securities as part of the consideration for 
the sale, although that exemption is not available as part of a sale outside 
of a plan under Bankruptcy Code § 363.199 The securities registration 
exemption permits the exchange of the securities of a debtor (or a 
successor to the debtor) principally for claims against the debtor.200 A third 
party buyer who does not have claims against the debtor may also rely on 
any applicable non-bankruptcy securities exemption, such as a private 
placement, to purchase securities from the debtor.201 
Furthermore, a plan sale must meet the voting and plan confirmation 
requirements of the Bankruptcy Code.202 Thus, creditors will have the 
benefits of disclosure and the plan voting and confirmation processes—
benefits that do not apply to asset sales under Bankruptcy Code § 363. 
These plan confirmation requirements protect creditors and also provide 
greater flexibility and powers to debtors through the plan sale process.  
Plan sales are intended to be final, and courts, utilizing the doctrine of 
“equitable mootness,” are generally reluctant to “unscramble the eggs” in the 
event a party seeks to appeal the confirmation of a plan.203 Developed by 
appellate courts, the equitable mootness doctrine supports the dismissal of 
appeals from final bankruptcy court orders under certain circumstances.204 
The doctrine emerged in order to constrain appeals and potential reversals of 
sales or plans to favor finality in the bankruptcy process.205 In Pacific Lumber, 
the Fifth Circuit found that equitable mootness is “firmly rooted in Fifth 
Circuit jurisprudence” and that the court’s job is to “strik[e] the proper balance 
between the equitable considerations of finality and good faith reliance on a 
judgment and competing interests that underlie the right of a party to seek 
                                                                                                             
 199. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(5)(J), 1145, 1123(a)(5)(C) (2012). 
 200. 11 U.S.C. § 1145(a)(1)–(2). 
 201. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (setting forth reorganization voting requirements); 11 
U.S.C. § 1129(a) (outlining reorganization confirmation requirements). 
 202. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a). 
 203. See In re Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 560–66 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 204. Bank of New York Trust Co., NA v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. 
(In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 240 (5th Cir. 2009) (“This court accordingly 
considers ‘(1) whether a stay was obtained, (2) whether the plan has been 
‘substantially consummated,’ and (3) whether the relief requested would affect either 
the rights of parties not before the court or the success of the plan.’”) (quoting Manges 
v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank (In re Manges), 29 F.3d 1034, 1039 (5th Cir. 1994)); see 
also In re Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d at 560 (“Factors that have been considered by 
courts in determining whether it would be equitable or prudential to reach the merits 
of a bankruptcy appeal include (1) whether the reorganization plan has been 
substantially consummated, (2) whether a stay has been obtained, (3) whether the 
relief requested would affect the rights of parties not before the court, (4) whether the 
relief requested would affect the success of the plan, and (5) the public policy of 
affording finality to bankruptcy judgments.”) (citing In re Manges, 29 F.3d at 1039; 
In re Public Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 469, 471-72 (1st Cir. 1992)). 
 205. In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 240. 




review of a bankruptcy order adversely affecting him.”206 Despite some 
criticism,207 the doctrine of equitable mootness remains an important 
consideration in the plan sale process. 
As discussed infra, parties seeking to consummate an energy sale by a 
plan of reorganization may select one of three primary options: (1) an asset 
sale; (2) a merger; or (3) a stock, or synthetic plan, sale. If parties are able to 
reach an agreement prior to the petition date, pre-packaged and pre-negotiated 
plans may be used to effectuate such sale structures. 
1. Asset Sales and Mergers 
Asset sales under plans of reorganization are similar to Bankruptcy 
Code § 363 sales in that they both enable a bankruptcy court to approve a 
transaction allowing a debtor to effectively sell its assets free and clear of 
liens, claims, and other encumbrances. 
The Bankruptcy Code requires a plan of reorganization to “provide 
adequate means for the plan’s implementation.”208 “Adequate means” 
includes the “transfer of all or any part of the property of the estate to one 
or more entities,” the “merger or consolidation of the debtor with one or 
more persons,” or the “sale of all or any part of the property of the 
estate.”209 Bankruptcy Code § 1123(a)(5)(C) permits the merger or 
consolidation of the debtor with “one or more persons” as part of the 
plan.210 A “person” is defined to include a partnership or a corporation.211 
Accordingly, a debtor corporation may be merged with one or more other 
corporations under a plan of reorganization. Such mergers are expressly 
authorized under the Bankruptcy Code, rendering any other approval 
required by non-bankruptcy law unnecessary. 
                                                                                                             
 206. Id. (quoting In re Manges, 29 F.3d. at 1039). 
 207. In re Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d at 569 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Thus, 
as this case well illustrates, the doctrine of ‘equitable mootness’ is not really about 
‘mootness’ at all in either the Article III or non-Article III sense. As the Seventh 
Circuit stated in a passage that the majority quotes with approval, ‘there is a big 
difference between inability to alter the outcome (real mootness) and 
unwillingness to alter the outcome (‘equitable mootness’). Using one word for 
two different concepts breeds confusion.’”) (internal citations omitted); see also 
In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that “equitable 
mootness” is a misnomer and banished from the local lexicon in order to consider 
instead “whether it is prudent to upset the plan of reorganization at this late date”). 
 208. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5) (2012). 
 209. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(5)(B), (C) & (D). 
 210. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(C). 
 211. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41). 
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2. Synthetic Plan Sales 
A plan of reorganization may also provide for a sale of equity interests 
in the reorganized debtor, often called a “synthetic plan sale.” A synthetic 
plan sale process may be proposed as a mechanism for vesting properties 
of the bankruptcy estate free and clear of liens, claims, and encumbrances 
in a buyer. In a synthetic plan sale, equity interests in the reorganized 
debtor are issued to the purchaser, and any assets, liabilities, and claims 
not purchased are transferred to a liquidating trust.212 A synthetic plan sale 
can often be structured in such a manner so as to avoid triggering 
preferential rights to purchase or rights of first refusal arising from actual 
asset transfers or contract assignments. Further protections are set forth in 
the plan’s discharge and injunction provisions, which prohibit creditors 
from pursuing pre-confirmation claims against the buyer or the 
reorganized debtor owned by the buyer.213 
3. Pre-Packaged Plans 
A pre-packaged plan of reorganization offers an efficient method for 
effectuating a transfer under a plan. Unlike a conventional Chapter 11 plan 
that is negotiated post-bankruptcy, a “pre-packaged plan,” or “prepack,” is 
both negotiated and voted on before a debtor files for bankruptcy. Pre-
packaged plans are commonly used when a sale transaction can be negotiated 
pre-bankruptcy; however, the parties to the sale must still invoke the powers 
of the bankruptcy process in order to bind non-consenting parties to the terms 
of the transaction. 
Bankruptcy Code § 1121 allows a debtor to file a plan of reorganization 
simultaneously with its bankruptcy petition and seek confirmation of the plan 
based on the requisite number of votes cast pre-petition.214 This expedited 
mechanism mitigates certain negative externalities which flow from a 
traditional Chapter 11 reorganization, including litigation costs, business 
disruption, negative publicity, turnover, and delays.215 Furthermore, by 
enabling the case to proceed straight to confirmation, pre-packaged plans also 
minimize judicial involvement in the debtor’s business affairs and operations. 
While the benefits are plentiful, prepackaged plans come with a cost, 
in that general trade creditors must often be paid in full under the plan to 
be unimpaired. Unimpaired creditors are deemed to vote to accept a plan; 
their votes need not be solicited.216 This unimpairment of trade creditors is 
important because, inter alia, soliciting votes from hundreds—if not 
                                                                                                             
 212. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(5)(B), (a)(5)(D), & (b)(3)(B). 
 213. 11 U.S.C. § 1141. 
 214. 11 U.S.C. § 1121. 
 215. See Wachtell, supra note 98, at 41–42. 
 216. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126(f), 1129(a)(8)(B). 




thousands—of trade creditors outside of bankruptcy can present an 
extremely difficult task. Accordingly, by paying the general trade creditors 
the full value of their claims, a prospective debtor seeking to confirm a 
prepackaged plan need not obtain the trade creditors’ consent, thereby 
increasing the chances of plan confirmation. 
To obtain confirmation of a pre-packaged plan, a debtor must adhere 
to the procedural requirements set forth in the Bankruptcy Code, or else 
risk the bankruptcy court refusing to confirm the prepackaged plan. Denial 
of confirmation may occur for a number of reasons, including a finding by 
the bankruptcy court that the solicitation process was deficient.217 
Bankruptcy Code § 1126(b) pertinently provides that: (1) prepackaged 
Chapter 11 plan votes must have complied with any applicable non-
bankruptcy law, rule, or regulation governing the adequacy of disclosure 
of vote solicitation; or (2) if there is no such law, rule, or regulation, votes 
on a pre-packaged Chapter 11 plan must have been solicited after 
disclosure of “adequate information,” as defined in the Bankruptcy 
Code.218 The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure also require timely 
transmission of the plan and other solicitation materials “to substantially 
all creditors and equity holders of the same class.”219 
If the pre-packaged plan provides for the offering of new securities, 
parties must also determine whether the offering of such new securities is 
exempt from the Securities Act registration requirements. Bankruptcy 
Code § 1145(a) provides a safe harbor for the issuance of new securities 
under a conventional plan of reorganization and exempts from registration 
“the offer or sale under a plan of a security of the debtor.”220 Whether this 
safe harbor exists with respect to pre-packaged plans, however, remains 
unclear because the Bankruptcy Code provides an exemption only for “a 
security of the debtor,” and the issuer pursuant to a prepack is not a 
“debtor” until the filing of the bankruptcy petition. In light of the current 
state of the law surrounding an offering of securities pursuant to a pre-
packaged plan, parties should err on the side of caution and file a 
registration statement with the SEC. 
                                                                                                             
 217. See, e.g., In re Southland Corp., 124 B.R. 211, 225 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
1991) (“A proponent of a prepackaged plan takes a substantial risk that . . . the 
Court may determine that the proposed disclosure statement or process of 
solicitation are inadequate”). 
 218. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b). The disclosure statement sets forth the terms of the 
plan of reorganization and the procedures for voting thereon. 
 219. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3018(b). A safe minimum time period of voting on a 
pre-packaged plan is twenty-eight days. See Wachtell, supra note 98, at 44 
(reasoning that twenty-eight days is a good rule of thumb because that is the 
minimum time specified in Bankruptcy Rule 2002(b) for considering a disclosure 
statement in bankruptcy). 
 220. 11 U.S.C. § 1145(a)(1). 
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4. Pre-Negotiated Plans 
Like pre-packaged plans, pre-negotiated plans are negotiated before a 
debtor files for bankruptcy. However, unlike prepacks, voting on pre-
negotiated plans does not occur until after a bankruptcy case is filed. As a 
result, pre-negotiated plans are generally subject to a marginally longer 
bankruptcy process. Nevertheless, they provide a significant advantage over 
prepacks in that the parties can obtain bankruptcy court approval of the 
solicitation process in advance, thereby reducing the risk of a flawed 
solicitation. 
As with prepacks, pre-negotiated plans commonly minimize certain 
negative externalities that arise from out-of-court transactions and the 
conventional Chapter 11 process, such as litigation costs, business 
disruptions, administrative expenses, negative publicity, and fraudulent 
transfer risk. Moreover, pre-negotiated plans also allow parties to reduce 
judicial involvement in the debtor’s business affairs. 
While a full vetting of “lock-up agreements” is beyond the scope of this 
article, in an effort to secure a successful pre-negotiated plan, parties often 
enter into lock-up agreements to bind key constituencies to ensure they 
support the plan. A lock-up agreement (sometimes referred to as a “plan 
support agreement”) is an agreement to accept and otherwise support a 
particular plan of reorganization. Lock-up agreements can provide significant 
protections, but they are not bulletproof and may be challenged if not 
appropriately structured.221 
                                                                                                             
 221. See, e.g., In re Innkeepers USA Trust, 442 B.R. 227, 232–36 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying debtor’s motion to assume plan support agreement 
because, among other reasons, (1) the plan support agreement was not a 
disinterested business transaction, (2) the debtor did not enter into the plan support 
agreement with “due care,” and (3) the debtor did not act in good faith in making 
the decision to enter into the plan support agreement and in providing 
transparency to their creditors). 





While prospective purchasers of distressed energy assets have a range of 
options to effectuate their acquisition objectives, dealing in distressed energy 
assets can be complex and may involve various risks depending on the 
circumstances of each acquisition. As this article has shown, there are 
advantages and disadvantages to both out-of-court and in-court transactions, 
which should be evaluated by prospective purchasers with the assistance of 
their financial and legal advisors. 
In the current environment for energy assets, there are risks and 
opportunities for sellers and buyers alike. The ability to transact will depend 
on available capital and understanding not only the business issues, but also 
the legal framework and processes that often come into play in distressed 
energy transactions. 
  




A. Key Fraudulent Transfer Cases 
1. Templeton v. O'Cheskey (In re Am. Hous. Found.), 785 F.3d 143 (5th 
Cir. Apr. 28, 2015), as revised (June 8, 2015). 
 
A trustee brought actual and constructive fraudulent transfer claims 
pursuant to federal law to avoid and recover approximately $1 million in 
purportedly fraudulent transfers related to guaranties given by the debtor to 
the defendants and subsequent payments that the defendants received from 
the debtor as “returns” on their respective contributions to a limited 
partnership. While the lower court applied the good faith defense under 
Bankruptcy Code § 548(c), the Fifth Circuit found the lower court used the 
wrong “good faith” standard and reversed and remanded. The Fifth Circuit 
concluded that the lower court should not rely exclusively on its determination 
that a party’s actions did not defraud other creditors, but should look further 
to whether the claimant should be on inquiry notice of the debtor’s insolvency 
or the fraudulent nature of the transaction. 
 
Applicable Statute: 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), 548(a)(1)(B), 548(c). 
 
2. Janvey v. Golf Channel, Inc., 780 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 
A receiver overseeing an estate brought suit to recover $5.9 million from 
the Golf Channel relating to an advertising contract the estate had entered into 
before the SEC uncovered a Ponzi scheme. The lower court determined that 
although the estate’s payments to the Golf Channel were actual fraudulent 
transfers under state law, the Golf Channel was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law on its affirmative defense under TUFTA that it received the 
payments in good faith and in exchange for reasonably equivalent value (the 
market value of advertising on The Golf Channel). On review, the Fifth 
Circuit rejected the argument that “reasonably equivalent value” was 
exchanged and held that Golf Channel’s services provided no value to the 
creditors of the estate, and, further, the advertising services did not provide 
even a speculative economic benefit to the creditors, regardless of the market 
value of the services. Thus, the Golf Channel’s affirmative defense to an 
actual fraudulent transfer under TUFTA was not established.222 
                                                                                                             
 222. This TUFTA “Erie” ruling appears to conflict with the precedent set forth 
in Williams v. FDIC (In re Positive Health Mgmt.), 769 F.3d 899 (5th Cir. 2014), 
summarized infra, interpreting the analogous good-faith, for-value defense under 
Bankruptcy Code § 548(c), as looking to the value given from the viewpoint of 
the transferee. 




Applicable Statute: TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.005(a)(1), 
24.009(a) (2015). 
 
3. Williams v. FDIC (In re Positive Health Mgmt.), 769 F.3d 899 (5th 
Cir. 2014). 
 
A trustee brought claims of actual and constructive fraudulent transfers 
under § 548 for rent payments made by the debtor to a lender on a loan that 
was made to another entity and secured by property that the debtor used for 
office space. The lower court held there was no constructive fraud since the 
debtor received reasonably equivalent value based on the value received for 
continuing operations without foreclosure and for a “reasonable rent” for the 
office space. While the lower court found actual fraud based on an “actual 
intent to hinder, delay or defraud” creditors, the lower court found that the 
affirmative defense of good faith, for value pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 
548(c) applied because the lender: (1) acted with good faith and (2) gave 
“value” in exchange for the payments. The Court relied on its prior holding in 
In re Hannover Corp., 310 F.3d at 799-802, that value for purposes of the 
good faith, for value affirmative defense is considered from the transferee’s 
perspective. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the good faith affirmative defense but 
only to the extent that the transferee gave value to the debtor in exchange for 
the transfer. The Fifth Circuit applied a “netting” approach, holding that 
Bankruptcy Code § 548(c) required the court to reduce the value of the 
fraudulent transfers by the value of the market rent, and to award the estate 
the difference. 
 
Applicable Statute: 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), 548(a)(1)(B), 548(c). 
 
4. Weisfelner v. Fund 1 (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.), 503 B.R. 348 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 
A parent company acquired the debtor entity by means of a leveraged 
buyout (LBO) in which the debtor company financed the entire purchase, 
taking on approximately $21 billion of secured indebtedness, of which $12.5 
billion was paid out to stockholders of the then-debtor-to-be. The debtor 
company filed for bankruptcy thirteen months later, and when its creditors 
found themselves ranking behind the LBO secured lenders, the creditors filed 
actual and constructive fraudulent transfer claims under state law. The court 
held that: (1) the Bankruptcy Code § 546(e) defense did not apply to state law 
fraudulent transfer claims not asserted under any Bankruptcy Code provision, 
and state law fraudulent transfer claims are not preempted by the Bankruptcy 
Code; (2) where the transaction was collapsed and considered based upon 
economic substance, the transfers were deemed to be property of the debtor; 
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(3) nominee, non-beneficial holders of stock cannot be held liable for 
fraudulent transfers; (4) a creditor’s trust cannot sue on behalf of creditors who 
ratified the transfers (but can sue on behalf of those who did not ratify); and 
(5) although evidence supporting allegations of actual fraud were deficient, 
the Court dismissed with leave to amend pleadings. 
 
Applicable Statute: State Law, but the court cited no specific statute and 
noted that “[t]he particular state law is not relevant to these motions, if it ever 
will be. State fraudulent transfer law is largely, but not entirely, the same 
throughout the United States . . . .”] 
 
5. Tronox Inc. v. Kerr McGee Corp. (In re Tronox, Inc.), 503 B.R. 239 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 
After a spinoff in 2006, the debtor retained substantial legacy, 
environmental, and tort liabilities that accrued over the course of seventy 
years, while the debtor’s valuable oil and gas exploration and production 
business was transferred into a new entity. A few months after the spinoff, a 
third party purchased the newly-formed entity’s recently acquired exploration 
and production business for $18 billion. The debtor subsequently filed for 
bankruptcy in 2009. Regarding actual fraud, the court found numerous 
“badges of fraud” and determined that the defendants lacked a good faith 
belief that the debtor would be able to support the liabilities that had been 
imposed on it after the spinoff. Thus, actual fraudulent intent to delay or hinder 
creditors was established under state law. Regarding constructive fraud, the 
court, after considering all related transactions together as a single transaction 
and analyzing market evidence, contingent liabilities, and asset valuation, 
held that the debtor did not receive “reasonably equivalent value” in the 
transaction. Based on numerous factors, the court found that the debtor was 
insolvent and unreasonably capitalized and that the defendants reasonably 
should have believed that the debtor would be unable to pay its debts as they 
became due. Thus, constructive fraud was also established under state law.  
 
Applicable Statute: 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), 548(a)(1)(B); Okla. Stat. 
tit. 24, §§ 116(A)(1), 116(A)(2), 117(A) (2015). 
 




6. Senior Transeastern Lenders v. Official Comm. of Unsecured 
Creditors (In re TOUSA, Inc.), 680 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 
A parent company paid a $421 million debt settlement to a third party 
transferee with the proceeds of a loan that was secured primarily by assets of 
the parent company’s subsidiaries even though the subsidiaries were not 
obligors on the debt to the third party transferee. Six months later, the parent 
company and the subsidiaries declared bankruptcy. The Eleventh Circuit held 
that the bankruptcy court did not err when it found transfer of the liens to the 
new lenders was constructively fraudulent pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 
548(a)(1)(B) because the subsidiaries did not receive “reasonably equivalent 
value” for the liens. The Eleventh Circuit did not define “value” but did find 
that benefits to the parent and the corporate family did not necessarily convey 
value to the subsidiary. 
 
Applicable Statute: 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B). 
 
7. Kaye v. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P., 453 B.R. 645 (N.D. Tex. 
2011). 
 
A parent company spun-off a subsidiary, and the subsidiary sued for 
actual and constructive fraudulent transfers under both federal and state law. 
Specifically, the subsidiary alleged that the parent company transferred 
various financial burdens to the subsidiary in an effort to improve the parent 
company’s marketability. In considering a motion to dismiss, the court ruled 
that constructive fraud was adequately pled based on proceeds flowing to the 
parent without reasonably equivalent value in return. With respect to actual 
fraud, the court found that the claim was adequately pled based on the 
following three badges of fraud: (1) transfers were to an insider, (2) the debtor 
received less than reasonably equivalent value, and (3) the debtor was 
insolvent. 
 
Applicable Statute: 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), 548(a)(1)(B); ALA. CODE 
§§ 8-9A-4(a), 8-9A-4(c), 8-9A-5(a) (2015). 
 
8. U.S. Bank Nat’l Assn. v. Verizon Commc’ns. Inc. (U.S. Bank Nat’l 
Assn. Litigation), 817 F. Supp. 2d 934 (N.D. Tex. 2011). 
 
A parent company spun-off a subsidiary whose balance sheet reflected 
that its debt exceeded its assets by approximately $9 billion after the spinoff. 
The subsidiary subsequently filed for bankruptcy twenty-eight months later. 
The subsidiary’s trust brought claims for actual and constructive fraudulent 
transfers under state and federal law. While the court found certain badges of 
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fraud to be present, the court ultimately found that the subsidiary was solvent 
as of the date of the spinoff, that there was no direct evidence of fraudulent 
intent, and that there were insufficient badges of fraud as a matter of law to 
prove an actually fraudulent transfer. The constructive fraudulent transfer 
claims also failed, as the court found that there was no effective difference 
between the insolvency analysis and the reasonably equivalent value analysis, 
and, since the subsidiary was solvent based on total enterprise value, the 
subsidiary received reasonably equivalent value. 
 
Applicable Statute: 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) – (B); TEX. BUS. & COM. 
CODE ANN. §§ 24.005(a)(1) – (2). 
 
9. The Liquidation Trust v. Daimler AG (In re Old Carco LLC (f/k/a 
Chrysler LLC)), 454 B.R. 38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 
A liquidation trust asserted fraudulent transfer claims based on a former 
parent company’s alleged intention to strip valuable assets away from the 
debtor before selling its controlling interest in the debtor. The court found that 
the trust did not sufficiently take into account all elements of value received 
in the overall transaction and held that the constructive fraudulent conveyance 
claims under federal and state law were properly dismissed because of the 
trust’s undervaluation and omission of various disputed consideration 
elements. 
 
Applicable Statute: 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW 
§ 273 (2015). 
 
10. ASARCO LLC v. Ams. Mining Corp., 396 B.R. 278 (S.D. Tex. 2008). 
 
The debtor sued its parent corporation to challenge a transfer under which 
the parent company received valuable stock assets of the debtor. Regarding 
constructive fraud, the court looked to Delaware law and analyzed whether 
“reasonably equivalent value” was given in exchange for the asset. Upon 
completing its valuation, the court found that, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the debtor received eighty-five to ninety percent of the value 
of the asset, which constituted “reasonably equivalent value.” As to actual 
fraud, the court found that the parent company did not properly market the 
stock to the highest bidder, removed the “crown jewel” asset from the estate, 
concealed information, broke promises, and closed the transaction over the 
objections of the independent directors with knowledge that the transaction 
would hinder and delay the debtor paying other creditors. Accordingly, the 
court found actual fraud and entered a judgment valued at over $6 billion 
against the parent company. 
 




Applicable Statute:  11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) –(B); 6 DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit 6, §§ 1304(a)(1) –(2) (2015), 1305(a) (2015). 
 
11. VFB LLC v. Campbell Soup Co., 482 F.3d 624 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 
A parent company spun-off a subsidiary and sold it several food 
companies. The subsidiary financed the purchase by taking on new secured 
debt and issuing a dividend to the parent’s shareholders upon the becoming 
an independent company. The subsidiary filed for bankruptcy within three 
years and sued the parent, asserting, inter alia, a constructively fraudulent 
transfer claim. The Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s rejection of the 
claim because (1) the food companies were worth well in excess of the amount 
the subsidiary paid for them at the time of the spin-off, (2) market valuation 
was sufficient to show the food companies were solvent at the time of the 
spin-off, and (3) “reasonably equivalent value” was exchanged. 
 
Applicable Statute: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 25:2-25(b), 25:2-27(a) (2015). 
 
12. Statutory Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Motorola, Inc. (In re 
Iridium Operating LLC), 373 B.R. 283 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 
A creditors’ committee brought suit to set aside transfers totaling 
approximately $3.7 billion from the debtor to its parent company during the 
four years leading up to the debtor’s bankruptcy. At issue was whether certain 
transfers were voidable fraudulent transfers or preferences, with a focus on 
whether the debtor was either insolvent or inadequately capitalized at the time 
the challenged transfers were made. The court determined that the 
“voluminous and compelling” contemporaneous market value of the debtor’s 
securities was consistent with “substantial enterprise value” and was 
“inconsistent with insolvency.” The court further determined that looking 
back at the market with “hindsight bias” in valuing the entity for purposes of 
insolvency was inappropriate because “the public trading market constitutes 
an impartial gauge of investor confidence and remains the best and most 
unbiased measure of fair market value and, when available to the court, is the 
preferred standard of valuation.” Id. at 293. The court held that the plaintiff 
had not carried its burden to prove either insolvency or unreasonably small 
capital and dismissed all fraudulent transfer claims. 
 
Applicable Statute: 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B); D.C. CODE § 28 –3102 
(2015). 
 
13. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Hayes (In re Hannover Corp.), 310 
F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2002). 




The trustee argued before the Fifth Circuit that the debtor’s transfers to a 
third party under an option agreement for the purchase of real estate could be 
avoided as actual and constructive fraudulent conveyances under federal law. 
The district court had reversed the bankruptcy court’s ruling that the transferee 
had taken the transfer in good faith and for value. The Fifth Circuit reversed 
the district court and found that the bankruptcy court was entitled to deference 
regarding its determination that the good faith, for value affirmative defense 
had been established under Bankruptcy Code § 548(c). The Fifth Circuit 
determined that the transferee acted in good faith and that (1) the call options 
had value from the perspective of the transferee, (2) the value was determined 
at the time of origination, and (3) the debtor’s practical inability to exercise 
the option is irrelevant to its valuation for purposes of the good faith, for value 
affirmative defense under Bankruptcy Code § 548(c). 
 
Applicable Statute: 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) – (B), 548(c). 
B. Glossary of Commonly Used Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Terms 
Note: The following definitions are provided to assist the reader in 
understanding some of the terms used in Chapter 11 proceedings generally. 
For more detailed and exact definitions, please review the Bankruptcy Code 
and consult with legal counsel. 
 
Administrative Claims: Fees of court-authorized professionals, trustee’s 
commissions, and claims of trade creditors and others for credit extended after 
the entry of the order for relief. Administrative claims generally are entitled 
to priority and must be paid before claims of any prepetition unsecured 
creditors. 
Anti-Assignment Clause: A provision in a contract that restricts or 
prohibits the transfer or assignment of interests in an executory contract or 
unexpired lease. 
Automatic Stay: When a Chapter 11 petition is filed, creditors are 
automatically prohibited from attempting to collect their prepetition claims 
from the debtor or proceeding against property of the debtor without first 
obtaining permission from the court to do so. 
Cash Collateral: Cash and cash equivalents that serve as collateral for a 
secured creditor’s claim. Included in this category are cash, bank deposits, 
proceeds from the sale of assets, accounts receivable collections, and rents. 




Class of Creditors: Creditors must be divided into classes in a plan of 
reorganization. The claims of general unsecured creditors are frequently 
grouped together as one class, but there may exist sufficient distinctions 
among the general unsecured creditors that justify dividing them into multiple 
classes. 
Confirmation: The approval by the court of a plan of reorganization. 
Consensual Plan: A plan of reorganization accepted by every class of 
creditors and equity holders. It is rare for a consensual plan not to be approved 
by a bankruptcy court. 
Conversion: The Bankruptcy Code, in general, allows a debtor to 
reorganize under Chapter 11 or to be liquidated under Chapter 7. A case may 
be changed, or converted, from administration under one chapter to 
administration under another by court order or upon the request of the debtor, 
any creditor, the United States Trustee, or any other party in interest. Creditors 
will often move to convert a Chapter 11 case to Chapter 7 if it does not appear 
that the debtor will be able to successfully reorganize, or if they think they 
would recover more in liquidation than under a reorganization. 
Cramdown: Confirmation of a plan of reorganization over the objection 
of a class of creditors or equity holders. Cramdown may occur only if at least 
one class of creditors whose claims are impaired by the plan votes to accept 
it. The court will cramdown a plan on a dissenting class only if it finds that 
the plan does not discriminate unfairly against that class and is fair and 
equitable as to that class. 
Debtor: The entity undergoing reorganization. 
Debtor in Possession: Unless and until a trustee is appointed, a debtor 
remains in possession of its assets and will manage its own affairs. The debtor 
in possession has a fiduciary obligation to its creditors, much the same as a 
court-appointed trustee. 
Discharge: The release of claims against the debtor. 
Disclosure Statement: When creditors are solicited to vote on a plan, they 
will receive the plan or a plan summary (if approved by the court), a ballot, 
and a disclosure statement. The disclosure statement is intended to give 
creditors adequate information about the debtor and the plan to permit them 
to make an informed judgment as to whether to vote for or against the plan. 
The debtor cannot send the disclosure statement to creditors until it has been 
approved by the bankruptcy court, after notice and a hearing. 
Examiner: A person appointed by the court, upon a motion of creditors or 
the United States Trustee, to look into the debtor’s books and records and 
dealings with third parties. The scope of the examiner’s duties are established 
by the court. The report prepared by the examiner is usually filed with the 
court and maintained as a public record. 
Fraudulent Transfer (or Conveyance): Transfers or conveyances that are 
deemed to be in fraud of creditors, either actually or constructively, may be 
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avoided under state law and/or the Bankruptcy Code by the debtor in 
possession or by the trustee. 
General Unsecured Claims: Those unsecured claims that are neither 
administrative nor priority claims. 
Involuntary Petition: Three or more creditors (or one creditor, if a debtor 
has fewer than twelve creditors) with undisputed, liquidated claims can put a 
debtor into bankruptcy by filing an involuntary petition if the debtor is not 
paying its debts generally as they become due. The bankruptcy court will give 
the debtor a chance to respond to the involuntary petition and then will hold a 
hearing on the involuntary petition. If the petitioning creditors prove their 
case, the bankruptcy court will enter an order for relief against the debtor. 
Lockup Agreement: An agreement between parties that binds creditors or 
other parties to the terms of a negotiated restructuring that is a common feature 
of out-of-court pre-packaged workout plans. 
Order for Relief: The declaration that the debtor’s business is subject to 
the court’s jurisdiction. In a voluntary case, an order for relief is automatically 
entered when the petition is filed. In an involuntary case, an order for relief 
can only be entered after giving the debtor the opportunity to defend the 
allegations in the petition. 
Petition: The documents filed with the bankruptcy court that initiate a 
bankruptcy case. 
Plan of Reorganization: Sometimes referred to by the shortened term 
“plan,” the document that, when approved by the bankruptcy court, specifies 
the treatment of the claims of the debtor’s creditors. A confirmed plan is 
binding on all creditors—even those who did not vote in favor of the plan. 
Where the debtor’s assets are liquidated in a Chapter 11 case, this document 
will instead be called a plan of liquidation. 
Preference: Payments made to creditors within 90 days prior to the filing 
of a petition on account of pre-existing debts may, under some circumstances, 
be avoided by the debtor in possession or trustee. The ninety-day period is 
extended to one year if the creditor is an insider of the debtor. A creditor’s 
committee may be instrumental in pursuing preference claims, particularly 
preference claims against insiders of the debtor. 
Preferential Rights: The rights provided to a third party by the terms of 
an executory contract or unexpired lease, which grant the party the first 
opportunity to purchase or assert some preference. Preferential rights are also 
known as rights of first refusal or preemptive rights. 
Priority of Claims: Prepetition unsecured claims that are entitled to be 
paid before the claims of the general unsecured creditors. The most common 
priority claims are for wages, employee benefits, customer deposits, and 
taxes. 
Proof of Claim: The document filed with the bankruptcy court by a 
creditor that establishes the amount and basis of its claim. 




Rule 2004 Examination: A procedure, similar to a deposition, for 
obtaining information from the debtor and third parties about the assets and 
liabilities of the debtor and other matters relevant to a case. The party being 
examined is asked questions under oath before a stenographer, who prepares 
a written transcript of the examination. The party may also be required to 
produce documents relevant to the case. 
Schedules: A document filed with the bankruptcy court by a debtor setting 
forth its assets and liabilities in detail. 
Section 341 Hearing: Commonly referred to as the first meeting of 
creditors, the debtor appears at an informal hearing, which, in a Chapter 11 
case, is conducted by the United States Trustee. All creditors are entitled to 
ask the debtor questions about its business, its assets and liabilities, and other 
matters relevant to the reorganization. 
Secured Creditor: A creditor whose claim is backed by collateral. 
Solvency (or Valuation) Opinion: A third party expert opinion that 
evaluates assets or transactions with a distressed company. 
Statement of Financial Affairs: A document filed with the bankruptcy 
court by a debtor that sets forth certain information about the debtor’s 
business, management, and finances. The statement of financial affairs is 
normally filed simultaneously with the schedules. 
Super-Priority Administrative Claim: A type of administrative claim that 
has priority over other administrative claims. Super-priority administrative 
claim status is often granted to a secured lender in connection with a cash 
collateral or borrowing stipulation. 
Trustee: A person who may be appointed by the United States Trustee, 
who is entrusted with the responsibility of managing the debtor’s business, 
pursuing claims against third parties, and maximizing the payment to creditors 
through a reorganization or, if appropriate, a liquidation of the business. In a 
Chapter 11 case, a trustee is appointed only upon court order after motion by 
a creditor, the United States Trustee, or another party in interest. Grounds for 
appointment of a trustee include fraud, dishonesty, or gross mismanagement 
by the debtor. 
United States Trustee: An officer of the United States Department of 
Justice responsible for monitoring Chapter 11 cases. The United States 
Trustee is responsible for appointing trustees and presiding at the Section 341 
hearing. The United States Trustee has the right to be heard on any matter 
coming before the bankruptcy court and to file motions with the bankruptcy 
court in furtherance of its duties. 
Voluntary Petition: A petition filed by the debtor. Most Chapter 11 cases 
are commenced by the filing of a voluntary petition. 
 
